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tI dedicate this paper to Pakistan, and to those who work to bring the creed to life: Faith,
Unity, Discipline. For the substance of this discussion, I am indebted to Professor
Osama Siddique for his guidance. The spirit of this paper comes entirely from my
parents; though they physically left Pakistan many years ago, they ensured that the love
of Pakistan and its culture was instilled in me. And without my husband's constant
support and encouragement, this paper would still be many rough drafts away.
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I. Introduction
[Wihereas some members of the judiciary are working at cross
purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against
terrorism and extremism thereby weakening the government and
the nation 's resolve diluting the efficacy of its actions to control
this menace;
Whereas there has .been increasing interference by some
members of the judiciary in government policy, adversely affecting
economic growth, in particular;
Whereas some judges by overstepping the limits of judicial
authority have taken over the executive and legislative functions;
I, General Pervez Musharraf Chief of Army Staff, proclaim
emergency throughout Pakistan.
I hereby order andproclaim that the constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance....
President General Pervez Musharraf s "Proclamation of
Emergency," November 3, 20071
"We are determined that until there is freedom for the judges
and the overturn of emergency rule, this war will continue. They
can't quiet us."
Anwar Shaheen, Lahore lawyer, referring to Pakistani lawyers'
protests against emergency rule and dismissal of Chief Justice
Iftikhar Chaudhry, November 6, 2007.2
"For us the restoration of the independent judges is a matter
of life and death. "
Amina Masood, wife of a terrorism suspect detained without
charge by the Pakistani Government.3
I Text of Pakistan Emergency Declaration, BBC NEWS, Nov. 3, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7077136.stm.
2 GriffWitte, Lawyers Take On Musharraf WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2007, at Al.
3 AMNESTY INT'L, DENYING THE UNDENIABLE: ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN
PAKISTAN 4 (July 2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/
018/2008/en/0de43038-57dd-1 ldd-be62-3f7ba2157024/asa330182008eng.pdf.
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On October 12, 1999, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General
Pervez Musharraf executed a military coup, ousting Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif and declaring himself President of
Pakistan.4 Musharraf joined the ranks of past army leaders who
inserted themselves into Pakistan's Executive Branch, and
likewise quickly moved to consolidate power for the Presidency.
But for the first time, these Executive abuses led to an
unexpected and forceful outcry of independence within the
Pakistani Judiciary that would lead to Musharraf s resignation.
In March 2007, after years of powerful executive rule,
Musharraf attempted to suspend Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.5
After the Chief Justice's recent independence and initiative in
ruling against Musharraf's shows of executive power, Musharraf's
claims that Chaudhry had misused his powers became
questionable. In the following months, Musharraf also declared a
state of emergency,6 replaced the Constitution with a Provisional
Constitutional Order,7 shut down independent television channels,8
and fired all federal judges who would not take an oath to uphold
his new emergency rule.9
As the world looked on, armies of black-suited lawyers in
Pakistan responded with an uproar of street protests and legal
battles." They were met by police batons, tear gas, imprisonments
based on arcane colonial-era laws, and threats of disbarment."
American lawyers in Washington and all over the country
marched in solidarity with their colleagues"2 and the American Bar
4 Laura Smith-Spark, Coup Leaders' Addiction to Power, BBC NEWS, Sept. 22,
2006, 5, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5368328.stm.
5 See Masud Alam, Blood and Batons Spur Pakistan Row, BBC NEWS, Mar. 17,
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/6462745.stm.
6 See supra note 1.
7 See Provisional Constitutional Order, No. 1 of 2007 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/pco 1_2007.html.
8 See Pakistan 'Censorship' Criticized, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7140060.stm.
9 See Pakistan Faces 'Defining Moment', BBC NEWS, Nov. 5, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/7078910.stm.
10 See In Pictures: Pakistan Lawyers' Protest, BBC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/6442747.stm.
11 See supra note 5.
12 See Terry Carter, Lawyers March in Solidarity with Jailed Pakistani Colleagues,
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Association presented its 2008 Rule of Law Award to "those
lawyers and judges in Pakistan who demonstrated courage in
upholding the rule of law in their country."' 3
This paper will examine the context in which President
General Pervez Musharraf acted against the Pakistan judiciary's
increasing independence and willingness to question and condemn
Executive power. 4  The paper will focus on Musharrafs
antagonistic relationship with Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry,
who became the symbol of judicial independence in Pakistan as he
led the Pakistan Supreme Court in checking executive power.
Section I gives a history of the current struggle, from Musharraf's
appointment as army chief, to the coup that brought him to power,
and finally to his dismissal of Chief Justice Chaudhry and other
federal judges. Section II examines the concept of judicial
independence as understood by the Pakistani judiciary, the
benefits of judicial autonomy, and why its existence in the
Constitution and judicial precedent requires compliance by the
Pakistani government.
To provide a background to the Chaudhry court's
independence, Section III provides a brief history of Article
58(2)(b),"5 a constitutional amendment passed by the previous
coup-maker President General Zia-ul-Haq, 16 which allows the
President to dismiss the National Assembly. This section will
A.B.A. J., Nov. 14, 2007, http://abajoumal.com/news/lawyerstomarch on
washington todayin solidarity with colleaguesjailed i/; see, e.g., Christine
Clarridge, Seattle Lawyers Join Pakistan Protest, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2004015086_lawyers
15m.html.
13 Press Release, American Bar Association, Heroism of Pakistani Lawyers, Judges
to be Honored By American Bar Association 1 (Apr. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/newsrelease.cfm?releaseid=325.
14 See Press Release, New York City Bar, Honarary Membership Bestowed Upon
Pakistan Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudry (Jan. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.abcny.org/PressRoom/PressRelease/2008_0114.htm. The New York City
Bar awarded Chief Justice Chaudhry an honorary membership, recognizing his "efforts
to uphold Pakistan's independent judiciary," and further recognizing him as "a symbol of
the movement for judicial and lawyer independence in Pakistan." Id. at 1.
15 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 58(2)(b) (Pak.),
available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part3.ch2.html.
16 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan amend. 8 (1985) (Pak.),
available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/
8amendment.html.
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briefly examine the judiciary's varied response when Article
58(2)(b) was used to dissolve two National Assemblies, repealed
by the National Assembly under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,
and finally reinstated by General Musharraf. 7
Section IV begins the legal examination of the current struggle
between executive and judicial power by examining the Zafar Ali
Shah case, in which the Supreme Court legitimized Musharraf's
1999 imposition of martial law. The section then examines how
Chief Justice Chaudhry began to lead the Court through increasing
challenges to executive power, focusing especially on three main
legal battles: (1) the Pakistan Steel Mills Case, where the Chief
Justice struck down the attempted privatization of the Pakistan
steel industry; (2) petitions brought by human rights groups to
challenge secret terrorism detentions; and (3) the judiciary's
reactions to Musharraf's unconstitutional attempt to run for
president while still holding an army post. In conclusion, Section
V concludes by summarizing the ebb and flow of judicial
independence in Pakistan and analyzing the importance of this
development to Pakistan's internal affairs and role as an actor in
the War on Terror.
II. General Pervez Musharraf's Military Rule
Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf commandeered
executive power through a bloodless military coup on October 13,
1999, deposing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.18 Over the next few
17 See generally Osama Siddique, The Jurisprudence of Dissolutions: Presidential
Power to Dissolve Assemblies Under the Pakistan Constitution and its Discontents, 23
ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 615 (2006). Osama Siddique is an S.J.D candidate at
Harvard Law School and the Founding Chair of and Associate Professor at the
Department of Law & Policy, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). For
this discussion, I am indebted to Professor Siddique and his article, which provides a
complete history of Article 58 and an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court's reactions
to its use by Pakistani Presidents, including an examination of the consistency of
individual justices as they responded to multiple iterations of Presidents using Article 58
to dissolve the National Assembly. For a fuller understanding of the issue of judicial
independence in Pakistan, I highly suggest that Professor Siddique's article be read as a
precursor to this one.
18 See Pakistan's Coup: The 17-Hour Victory, BBC NEWS, Nov. 11, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/475195.stm. Sharif replaced Musharraf with
General Ziauddin, but the new General found that no senior officer was prepared to
accept his command. Id. Ziauddin told Nawaz Sharif that if Musharraf was prevented
from returning to the country, he was sure he could take control. Nawaz Sharif
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years as President, Musharraf retained his position as Chief of
Army Staff while consolidating executive power in his person.
The coup began on October 13, 1999, when, reacting to long-
standing tensions between the two, Prime Minister Sharif fired
Musharraf while the General was on an official visit to Sri Lanka.
When Musharraf tried to fly back into Karachi on a Pakistan
International Airlines flight, Prime Minister Sharif ordered that the
plane, full of civilians and running out of fuel, not be allowed to
land.19
The army high command responded by marching troops into
Islamabad and placing Prime Minister Sharif and his loyalists
under house arrest.2" The army also cut telephone lines and the
signal to the Pakistan State Television station, on which Mr. Sharif
had been expected to announce General Musharraf's
"resignation."21  Soldiers marched into the Karachi airport and
forced the air traffic controllers to allow the plane to land."2 By
the time Musharraf landed, the army "controlled the TV stations,
administrative buildings, the power and communications
infrastructure - and had the entire cabinet under guard."23 When
the army restored television broadcasts, "a terse announcement ran
across the bottom of the screen stating that Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif had been dismissed. 2 4
For the next nine years of his presidency,25 General Musharraf
continued to solidify his position by increasing the power of the
President while still retaining his position as Chief of Army
reportedly ordered that the flight land in Sindh, where the Prime Minister's security team
was waiting to arrest Musharraf. Musharraf instead ordered the pilot to continue to
Karachi and fly in circles around the city. Id. Overall, Musharraf was rather well
received after the coup. He was seen as a modernizer, a reformer who would clean up
corruption in Pakistan's government. See Carlotta Gall & Jane Perlez, For Musharraf,
Reduced Power as the President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2007, at Al.
19 Sharif 'Diverted Aircraft.' BBC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/636396.stm. Two hundred civilians were on the
flight. Id.
20 Pakistan 's Coup: The 17-Hour Victory, supra note 18.
21 Id.
22 Id. The plane reportedly had only seven minutes of fiel remaining. Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 UK Reacts to Musharraf Resignation, BBC NEWS, Aug. 18, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7568028.stm.
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Staff 26 On October 14, 1999, Musharraf issued the Proclamation
of Emergency 27 declaring himself the Chief Executive of Pakistan,
and promulgated a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) to
replace the 1973 constitution. 2' The PCO also suspended the
National Assembly and provincial assemblies, and prohibited the
judiciary from acting against the Chief Executive.2 9 In January
2000, Musharraf ordered the judiciary to take a new oath of office
by swearing to uphold the 1999 PCO. Six judges refused and
were dismissed from their posts; they were replaced by judges
who had sworn to uphold General Musharraf's PCO and
subsequent executive actions.30 On May 12, 2000, the Supreme
Court, composed of judges who had taken this new oath of office,
heard the Zafar Ali Shah case3' and approved Musharraf's military
coup under a doctrine of state necessity.
32
26 See Musharraf to 'Give up Army Post,' BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasiaI7000120.stm. Musharraf kept his dual position
throughout his presidency, promising to give it up only if he was re-elected in the
November 2007 election. Id. The President to Hold Another Office Act, 2004, allowed
Musharraf to be President and Chief of Army Staff at the same time, though this dual
role would have been otherwise prohibited by Article 63 of the Pakistan Constitution.
President to Hold Another Office Act, 2004 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/2004/actVIlof2004.html; see also Jayshree
Bajoria, Pakistan's Constitution, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/11 /AR200803
1101365.html. Moeen Cheema, Professor of Law and Policy at Lahore University of
Management Sciences, explains that army chiefs who have taken over the government in
Pakistan have a
classic maneuvering that follows to give these coups legitimacy and strengthen
the powers of the military rulers. [T]he army chiefs take six important steps.
They co-opt the bureaucracy; use accountability against politicians; entrench the
army in political and civil affairs; create a new breed of politicians subservient
to them under the guise of local government reform; hold elections to create
some sort of democratic legitimacy; and finally move to co-opt the judiciary.
Id.
27 Text of Musharraf's Declaration, BBC NEWS, Oct. 14, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/475415.stm. Note that this is different from the
2007 emergency declaration. Text of Pakistan Emergency Declaration, supra note 1.
28 Destroying Legality: Pakistan 's Crackdown on Lawyers and Judges, HUM. RTS.
WATCH 15, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/12/18/destroying-
legality-0 [hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH]; see also Siddique, supra note 17, at 615.
29 See Siddique, supra note 17, at 695.
30 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 15.
31 Shah v. Musharraf, [2000] 52 PLD SC 869, 1219-23 (Pak.).
32 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 15.
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To mixed reactions, Musharraf declared himself President of
Pakistan on June 20, 2001, removing Sharif-appointed President
Rafiq Tarar.33 After September 11, 2001, Musharraf became an
American ally in the War on Terror, not in the least because
Pakistan shares its northern border with Afghanistan.34 The Bush
administration looked to Musharraf for military and intelligence
support in fighting Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistani tribal
areas.35 Pakistan received economic and military aid from the
United States, and President Bush called Musharraf a "leader of
great courage and vision."36
Reassuring the country that he was "not power hungry," and
that he wanted to create "real democracy," Musharraf declared on
April 5, 2002 that he would allow a referendum to extend his term
as president for five years, even after the new National Assembly
elections in October.37 The promises of democracy fell through,
however, on August 21, 2002, when Musharraf announced twenty-
nine constitutional amendments that expanded the power of the
president. Among the changes was the Seventeenth Amendment,
which secured for the president the power to dissolve the National
Assembly and granted Musharraf indemnity for all his actions
since the coup.38 Whereas before, the president was simply a
figurehead officer, the amendments now allowed Musharraf to
dissolve an elected National Assembly and appoint military chiefs
and Supreme Court justices.3 9 The amendments also gave the
33 John F. Bums, Pakistan's Military Ruler Declares Himself President, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2001, at A3.
34 See Simon Henderson, Pakistan and the War on Terror, THE WASH. INST. FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
print.php?template=C05&CID=2677.
35 Jane Perlez, After Musharraf U.S. Struggles to Find New Pakistan Ally Against
Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2008, at A6.
36 David E. Sanger, A Nation Challenged: Diplomacy; Bush Hails Musharraf, and
Warns Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at A16.
37 Seth Mydans, A Nation Challenged: Pakistan; Musharraf Plans a Referendum to
Let Him Stay in Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A6.
38 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan amend. XVII (2003) (Pak.),
available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/17
amendment.html; see also Siddique, supra note 17, at 702.
39 David Rohde, Musharraf Redraws Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at
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military limited seats on the new National Security Council.4" In
2004, the National Assembly passed the President to Hold Another
Office Act, allowing only Musharraf to simultaneously hold the
President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff offices.41 Without
this provision, Article 63 of the Constitution, which prevents a
member of the National Assembly from holding another office for
profit, would have prohibited this dual role.42
Musharraf's relationship with Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry
began amiably enough when Musharraf appointed Chaudhry as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan on May 7, 2005.43
Chief Justice Chaudhry, however, began to grant hearings and to
rule against the government on issues that the judiciary would
traditionally have either dismissed on a technicality or ignored as
politically non-justiciable. 4  It began with the June 23, 2006
Pakistan Steel Mills decision, where, in an "unprecedented act of
defiance," Chief Justice Chaudhry annulled the privatization sale
of Pakistan's nationally-owned steel mills industry.45 In nullifying
the sale, Chaudhry embarrassed the government by laying blame
on Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz "for approving the under-priced
sale of a major national asset."46  The defiance continued in
January 2007 as the Supreme Court granted and began holding
hearings on charges brought by the Human Rights Commission of
40 Id. General Zia-ul-Haq first claimed the power to dissolve an elected National
Assembly by passing Article 58 after he also became President through a military coup.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's administration, the first civilian-elected government after
martial law ended, repealed Article 58(2)(b). Musharraf reclaimed this power through
the 17th Amendment. Id.
41 See supra note 31.
42 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 63 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part3.ch2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
43 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 16.
44 Salman Masood, Suspension of Jurist Unleashes Furor Against Musharraf, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at A12. "Chief Justice Chaudhry has drawn the ire of the
government because 'he began to take the constitutional guarantee of judicial
independence too seriously and began to poke the judicial finger into holy waters,' said
Babar Sattar, a lawyer and newspaper columnist based in Islamabad." Id. at 12.
45 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 16.
46 Masood, supra note 44. "Chief Justice Chaudhry had considerably embarrassed
the government by overturning the much-publicized privatization of a steel mill, which
tainted Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz for approving the underpriced sale of a major
national asset." Id. at 13.
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Pakistan on behalf of "disappeared" terrorism suspects.47
On March 9, 2007, in an attempt to reassert his power,
Musharraf tried to put Chief Justice Chaudhry on "compulsory
leave" for "misuse of office," but the Chief Justice challenged the
charges and refused to resign. 48  General Musharrafs friend and
memoir author, Humayun Gauhar, said that "[Musharraf] lost his
head and tried to fire the chief justice," and that "asking the chief
justice to retire was a command ... I don't think the refusal was
ever in [Musharraf's] scheme."49 Chaudhry also claimed (and the
government denied) that he and his family were placed under
house arrest.5 ° Musharraf s victory was short-lived, however; on
July 20, 2007, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
Chaudhry's dismissal was unconstitutional.5 Ten out of the
thirteen-member bench also called for Chaudhry's reinstatement.52
Musharrafs next challenge was to be elected as President of
Pakistan. The difficulty lay not in the votes but in the
Constitution.
Pakistan's Constitution does not allow an army officer to hold
the civilian office of President. 53  The issue was taken to the
Supreme Court on September 28, 2007 where, under great
political pressure, the Court dismissed the petitioners' challenge to
Musharraf's dual role on technical grounds. 54  The case was re-
filed and reached the Court again on October 5, 2007. The
Supreme Court decided not to stay the election but held that the
47 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 16; see also Salman Masood, supra
note 44. "Since Pakistan joined the American-led effort to curb terrorism in 2001,"
human rights groups noted the disappearance of at least 400 people "believed to have
been picked up by [Pakistan's] powerful intelligence agencies without due process of
law." Id. at 14.
48 HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 6; see also Masood, supra
note 44.
49 Gall & Perlez, supra note 18, at A14. Humayun Gauhar is Musharrafs friend
and ghostwriter of Musharrafs memoir. Id. See generally PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, IN THE
LINE OF FIRE: A MEMOIR (2006).
50 Salman Masood, supra note 44.
51 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 12; see also Somini Sengupta, Musharraf
Loses Fight Over Suspension of Judge, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at Al.
52 Sengupta, supra note 51.
53 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 63 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part3.ch2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
54 Hum. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 17.
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Election Commission could not certify the result until the Court
ruled on petitions challenging Musharraf's rule.55
Musharraf easily won the parliamentary election on October 6,
2007; the race was a landslide, because all other candidates
dropped out and all opposing parties boycotted in protest of his
candidacy.16 As ordered, however, the Election Commission did
not certify the result.57 Because of the assemblies' support for
Musharraf, the Supreme Court was now under great political
pressure to vote in favor of Musharraf and to approve a
constitutional amendment allowing Musharraf to continue holding
both the offices of Chief of Army Staff and President of
Pakistan.5 8
The Court held hearings on November 2, 2007, and was
expected to reach a decision on November 9.59 Musharraf took
swift action to pre-empt any possibility of a decision against his
candidacy. At 5:00 pm on November 3, 2007, General Musharraf,
acting as Chief of the Army, declared a state of emergency and
replaced the Constitution with another Provisional Constitutional
Order, effectively precluding the Court from acting.6" Chief
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry led seven Supreme Court justices in an
emergency meeting on the evening of November 3, and issued an
order "barring the government from proclaiming emergency rule
and urging government functionaries not to implement emergency
orders."'" When the Justices returned to their homes in the
Judges' Colony, they found their houses surrounded by police,
who had "blocked journalists from entering, . . . disconnected
55 Id. at 18.
56 See Carlotta Gall, Boycotts and Legal Fight Cloud Victory for Musharraf, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, at A3. As required by the Parliamentary system, Musharraf won a
ninety-eight percent majority of votes from the national and provincial assemblies to
defeat his only opponent, former Supreme Court judge Wajihuddin Ahmed. The
Electoral College gave Musharraf more than fifty percent of its vote. Id.
57 HuM. RTs. WATCH, supra note 28, at 18.
58 Id. at 17-18.
59 Id.
60 Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 2007 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/pco_12007.html; see also
HUM. RTs. WATCH, supra note 28 at 2.
61 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 5-6; see also David Rohde, Pakistani Sets
Emergency Rule, Defying U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at Al.
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telephone lines and jammed cellphones [sic] in the area."6 Hours
later, Pakistan's state television announced that three loyalist
judges had taken a new oath of office, swearing to uphold
Musharraf's emergency measure, and that pro-government judge
Abdul Hameed Doger had replaced Chaudhry as Chief Justice.63
Musharraf addressed the nation on the night of November 3,
defending his decision to declare emergency rule and claiming he
wanted to "preserve the democratic transition that [he] initiated
eight years back."'64 He argued that the Supreme Court's "judicial
activism" was responsible for releasing sixty-one suspected
terrorists, demoralizing Pakistan's security forces, and crippling
Pakistan's actions in fighting terrorism and spreading
democracy." "Obstacles are being created in the way of
democratic process," said Musharraf, "I think for vested, personal
interests, against the interest of the country."66 Two subsequent
orders shut down all independent news stations and prohibited any
report that "[brought General Musharraf or other officials] into
ridicule or disrepute," publicized statements from terrorist groups,
or showed pictures of suicide bombers or victims of suicide
attacks.67
Musharraf resigned his post as Army Chief on November 28,
2007, and, the next day, amidst continued protest from the legal
and political community, was sworn in as a civilian president.68
Even though he had less power as a civilian president in Pakistan's
Prime Minister-led parliamentary democracy, the powers
Musharraf had secured for the position with his November 3
emergency decree boosted his presidency. 69 Specifically,
62 Rohde, supra note 61.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See Gall & Perlez, supra note 18; Carlotta Gall, Musharraf Defends Actions
After Taking Oath, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/world/asia/30musharraf.html. Lawyers protested
all over Pakistan on the day of Musharraf's swearing in, clashing with police. "We are
not scared," said one lawyer, bleeding from the head after he was hit with a brick. "We
don't accept Musharraf even without his uniform. He has to go." Id.
69 Gall & Perlez, supra note 18.
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Musharraf reserved for himself "the power to lift the de facto
martial law" that he imposed in November.70
III. Judicial Independence and Judicial Activism in Pakistan
In order to better explain the relationship of the Pakistan
judiciary to executive and parliamentary power, both before and
after General Musharraf took power, this section seeks to define
two concepts that will be analyzed in this paper: Judicial
independence and judicial activism. Both of these terms have
been used, often interchangeably, to describe the change in the
Pakistan judiciary led primarily by Chief Justice Chaudhry.7
For the purposes of this paper, an independent judiciary is
understood to encompass the following ideal characteristics:
(1) A judiciary free from the arbitrary and capricious use of
executive or parliamentary power to influence judicial
action.
(2) A judiciary that makes legal rulings primarily based on
precedent and objective standards rather than the justices'
personal political views.
(3) A judiciary whose rulings are followed by government
actors and other affected parties.
These characteristics are not exclusive and take into account
the role of the judiciary as explained in the Pakistani constitution
and by precedent. However, these principles, especially the
70 Id. Parliamentary elections were set for January 8, 2008. Both Benazir Bhutto
and Nawaz Sharif, exiled former Prime Ministers, were back in Pakistan and joined the
legal community in calling for Musharraf's resignation and for action to overturn the
presidency's reserved power over the National Assembly. Id. Benazir Bhutto was
assassinated on December 27, 2007 while she was giving a speech at a rally. Salman
Masood & Carlotta Gall, Bhutto Assassination Ignites Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/world/asia/28pakistan.html.
71 See Nasir Iqbal, CJ Suspended, Escorted Home, DAWN, Mar. 10, 2007,
http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/10/topl.htm.
Chaudhry's judicial activism ... had made him popular in the eyes of ordinary
people seeking justice but [had] irked a few in [Musharraf's administration].
Some of his decisions had started to appear like an open challenge to the
government, and in recent weeks cases of missing persons had been a cause of
embarrassment for a few in high places." Id.; see also Address of Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry to the New York Bar, supra note 14. The New York
City Bar awarded Chief Justice Chaudhry an honorary membership, recognizing
his "efforts to uphold Pakistan's independent judiciary," and "a symbol of the
movement for judicial and lawyer independence in Pakistan." Id.
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second and third, present the most significant ways in which the
Musharraf administration has recently threatened the
independence of the Pakistani judiciary.
Judicial activism has been criticized as inappropriate judicial
action that goes beyond the realm of interpretation of law into
policy decisions, stepping into the Legislature's duty.72  While
judicial independence implies a sense of balance and autonomy
between parts of government, judicial activism implies that the
judiciary is proactively reaching out to initiate change in policy or
action by the executive and legislative branches.73 Judicial
activism may have a proper role in an independent judiciary based
on a concept of separation of powers; however, if the Court
continually ignores executive excesses, it "might appear to be
abdicating its duty to interpret the Constitution if it [is]
consistently punt[ing] on hard questions."74 Thus, even if policy
questions emerge when the Court is analyzing a controversy, "the
Supreme Court can and should declare what the law is, even in
difficult or politically sensitive cases. 75
A. The Role of the Judiciary in Pakistan 's Constitution and
Precedents
The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan places the Supreme Court
of Pakistan above four provincial High Courts and "such other
courts as may be established by law., 76  The Supreme Court has
72 Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism, " 92
CAL. L. REv. 1441, 1460 (2004). Though this article interprets judicial activism in the
American legal system, the framework of the judiciary and the understandings ofjudicial
roles are so similar that it is fair to make the analysis. For example, Chief Justice Irshad
Hasan Khan in the Zafar Ali Shah case extensively quotes the American judicial theories
of Alexander Hamilton and Judge Learned Hand. See Shah v. Musharaff [2000], 52
PLD SC 869, 1121 (Pak.).
73 See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is a
proper part of the judicial function to make law as a necessary by-product of the
processes of deciding actual cases and controversies. But to reach out so blatantly and
unnecessarily to make new law in a case of this kind is unabashed judicial activism.").
74 Kmiec, supra note 72, at 1465.
75 Id.
76 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 175(1) (Pak.), available
at www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part7.chl.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
The 1973 Constitution was a reaction to the "president-centric" form of government
created by the 1972 Constitution during General Ayub Khan's military presidency. The
Constitution of 1973 "reversed the situation and made presidential power strictly subject
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original jurisdiction by which it may issue declaratory judgments
over any dispute between the federal and provincial governments
or hear a petition if the matter is of public importance and no other
adequate remedy exists.77 The Court has appellate jurisdiction
from another court's "judgment, decree, final order or sentence. 78
The Constitution also makes the Supreme Court's legal rulings
unquestionably final and binding on other courts and executive
officials. 79  Furthermore, the Supreme Court can rely on the
cooperation of other officials, as the Constitution provides that "all
executive and judicial authorities through out [sic] Pakistan shall
act in aid of the Supreme Court."8
The intent of Pakistan's founders to have a judiciary protected
from executive control is clear: "The judiciary shall be separated
progressively from the Executive within [fourteen] years from the
commencing day [of the country's founding]."8  However, the
President of Pakistan has considerable authority over the
appointment of the Chief Justice and Justices. The Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court is to be headed by the Chief
Justice of Pakistan and otherwise consists of a number of judges
that may be determined by the National Assembly or the
President.82 The Chief Justice is appointed by the President, "and
each of the other Judges shall be appointed by the President after
to prime ministerial advice, while including safeguards against prime ministerial abuse"
of power. Siddique, supra note 17, at 631. This balance was thrown off by General Zia-
ul-Haq's creation of Article 58(2)(b), which gave the President the power to dissolve the
National Assembly practically at will. 1d.
77 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 184 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part7.chl.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
78 Id. The President can also ask the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion "on
any question of law which he considers of public importance." Id. art. 186(1).
79 Id. art. 189. "Any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it
decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on
all other courts in Pakistan." Id.
80 Id. art. 190. The Supreme Court's opinion of itself and its role in the Pakistani
government is also worth reading. Supreme Court of Pakistan Website, Overview,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=1 16 (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
81 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art.175(3) (Pak.), available
at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part7.chl.html.
82 Id. at art. 176 (Pak.), available at http://www.pakistani.org
/pakistan/constitution/part7.ch2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). (The number of judges
will be "so many other Judges as may be determined by Act of (the National Assembly],
or, until so determined, as may be fixed by the President.") Id.
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consultation with the Chief Justice.""3 Before entering office, the
Chief Justice "shall make an oath before the President, and any
other Judge of the Supreme Court shall make [an oath] before the
Chief Justice." 4 If the office of the Chief Justice is vacant or if
the Chief Justice "is absent or is unable to perform the functions of
his office due to any other cause," the President can appoint the
most senior of the remaining justices "to act as the Chief Justice of
Pakistan."85 The justices of the Pakistan Supreme Court do not
have lifetime tenure; they only hold office until they reach sixty
five years of age, resign, or are "removed from office in
accordance with the Constitution.'8 6
The judiciary also envisions itself as more than just a
counterbalance to executive and judicial power. Chief Justice
Irshad Hasan Khan, writing for the majority in Syed Zafar Ali
Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf8 7 stated that the province of
the judiciary is to protect fundamental rights and individual
freedoms and to ensure checks and balances to sustain the
separation of powers.88 These duties "[call] for an independent
and vigilant system of judicial administration so that all acts and
actions leading to infringement of Fundamental Rights are
nullified and the rule of law upheld in the society." 9 Furthermore,
the judiciary's role is not only to abstractly protect the
Constitution and laws of the land, but to actively promote the
welfare of the country and its people.
[The Judiciary] is called upon to enforce the Constitution
and safeguard the Fundamental Rights and freedom of
individuals. To do so, the Judiciary has to be properly
organized and effective and efficient enough to quickly
address and resolve public claims and grievances; and also
has to be strong and independent enough to dispense
justice fairly and impartially. It is such an efficient and
independent Judiciary which can foster an appropriate
83 Id. art. 177(1).
84 Id. art. 178.
85 Id. art. 180.
86 Id. art. 179.
87 Shah v. Musharraf, [2000] 52 PLD SC 869 (Pak.).
88 Id. at 1121, 211-12. Chief Justice Khan actually includes an entire passage on
judicial independence from THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
89 Id. at 1121, 211.
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legal and judicial environment where there is peace and
security in the society, safety of life, protection of property
and guarantee of essential human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all individuals and groups, irrespective of any
distinction or discrimination on the basis of cast [sic],
creed, colour, culture, gender or place of origin, etc. It is
indeed such a legal and judicial environment, which is
conducive to economic growth and social development.
90
Because the Pakistani Constitution and the Courts themselves
recognize their role as counter-balance to executive and judicial
power and as an active protector of fundamental rights, it is fair to
analyze judicial actions by these standards. Historically, however,
the Pakistan Judiciary "was not known for its independence.' 9'
Since the country was founded, the Courts have refrained from
questioning executive and legislative actions in any meaningful
way, deferentially arguing that "the power of judicial review
should be exercised with caution"92 and "[j]udges must take care
not to intrude upon the domain of the other branches of
Government." 93 However, when Iftikhar Chaudhry began his role
as Chief Justice, a notable change occurred in the judiciary's
response to executive and legislative action. Not only did Chief
Justice Chaudhry lead the Supreme Court in granting hearings and
ruling against the executive on previously untouched issues, his
actions mobilized the entire Pakistani legal community to take
action against Musharraf's abuse of Executive power. The
Chaudhry Court's actions, which prompted the community-wide
movement, created a judiciary that broke from tradition in its
willingness to analyze and overturn the administration's excesses.
90 Id. at 1121, 212.
91 Maureen Byrns, et. al., Pakistan's Courts and Constitution Under Attack,
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Feb. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/
pdf/08215-hrd-pakistan-courts-reports.pdf; see also Satish Kumar, Judicial Subservience
Hampered Democracy in Pakistan, South Asian Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 2007,
available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/june07/judicial_
subservience_hampered democracypakistan.pdf. ("Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed
Chaudhry of Pakistan has created history by defying the chief executive of a country in
which judiciary was always suppressed by the chief executive, or else it played a
subservient role of its own accord. And the game of suppression began much before the
first military coup in 1958."). Id.
92 See Shah, PLD 2000 SC at 1123, T 215.
93 Id. (quoting Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan through
Secretary, Interior Division, 1994 SCMR 2142, 12).
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IV. A Weak Foundation: The Supreme Court's Acquiescence
to the Article 58(2)(b) Presidential Power
Article 58(2)(b) is a Constitutional provision that provides the
President "with untrammeled discretionary powers to dissolve
[The National Assembly] on a largely subjective judgment of [its]
performance., 94 The Supreme Court's judicial review of Article
58(2)(b) dissolutions provides insight into the willingness, or lack
thereof, of the Court to check Executive power in the decades
leading up to the Musharraf presidency. The image that emerges
is of a judiciary that was neither decidedly independent nor
thoroughly controlled by the Executive. Rather, the Court's
willingness to question the Executive ebbed and flowed as judges
strayed between both statutory and precedent-based decisions and
also judicial extensions of their own political preferences. With
the first use of Article 58(2)(b), the Pakistan judiciary used the
Constitution to narrowly define the Article 58(2)(b) power but not
actually reversed the Executive action. Ultimately, judges
vacillated between stringent and relaxed tests, and though each use
of Article 58(2)(b) was legally challenged, it was "invariably
judicially legitimized[,] . . . undermin[ing] judicial integrity,
capacity, and consistency."95
A. Article 58(2)(b): The Presidential Power of Dissolution
Article 58(2)(b) was added to the Constitution in 1985 by
General Zia-ul-Haq, the army chief who became President after a
military coup in 1977.96 The operative clause allows the President
to "dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion, where, in his
opinion:" (a) the Prime Minister has lost the confidence of the
National Assembly and no other member can fulfill the role, or (b)
when "a situation has arisen in which the Government of the
Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.
97
94 Siddique, supra note 17, at 622.
95 Id. at 623.
96 Id. at 622.
97 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 58(2)(b) (Pak.), supra
note 15. Proponents of the Article thought of this clause as a "safety valve" that would
avoid martial law by providing a constitutional method of resolving a government
stalemate. See Siddique, supra note 17, at 623. Opponents argue that "Article 58(2)(b)
has been a reason for, rather than a solution to, acute political instability" and that it "has
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Since General Zia first used the Article to dissolve the National
Assembly, "four elected governments were dissolved through it in
the short span of eight years." 98 In 1997, the National Assembly
led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif eliminated Article 58(2)(b)
with the Thirteenth Amendment,99 but President Musharraf
reinstated Article 58(2)(b) with the Legal Framework Order, 2002,
and the Seventeenth Amendment.100
B. The Irregular Judicial Review ofArticle 58(2)(b)
General Zia-ul-Haq first used Article 58(2)(b) on May 29,
1988 when he announced that he was dissolving Prime Minister
Muhammad Khan Junejo's National Assembly.' Zia charged
"that the National Assembly was not up to the task of adequately
performing its role and had failed to safeguard the property, honor,
and security of the people.""'2 In its first opportunitu to interpret
Article 58(2)(b), the Supreme Court in Pakistan v. Muhammad
Saifullah Khan (Haji Saifullah) based its judgment on detailed
constitutional interpretation and severely limited the power,
"exud[ing] enthusiasm for the restoration of democracy, openly
had hugely negative ramifications for a nascent democratic culture." Id. at 623.
98 Siddique, supra note 17, at 623 (citing Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political
History of Pakistan, 863-64 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001)). Four elected National
Assemblies were dissolved from 1988 to 1996: The National Assembly under Prime
Minister Junejo in 1988, PM Benazir Bhutto's first National Assembly in 1990, PM
Nawaz Sharifs National Assembly in 1993, and PM Bhutto's second term National
Assembly in 1996. Id.
99 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan amend. XIII (1997) (Pak.),
available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/
13amendment.html. The amendment simply removed the power: "In the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan . . . Article 58, in clause (2) sub-clause (b) shall be
omitted." Id.
100 Siddique, supra note 17, at 623. The Legal Framework Order, 2002 (LFO 2002)
reinstated Clause 58(2)(b); the Seventeenth Amendment validated and affirmed the LFO
2002 and added clause 58(3), requiring judicial confirmation of the dissolution. The
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan amend. XVII (2003) (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/1 7amendment.html (last
visited Jan. 11, 2009).
101 Siddique, supra note 17, at 649 (citing Haji Saifullah, 41 PLD 166 (1989)
(Pak.)). Zia's charges were "that the National Assembly was not up to the task of
adequately performing its role and had failed to safeguard the property, honor, and
security of the people." Id.
102 Siddique, supra note 17, at 649.
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professing faith in a parliamentary system. °10 3
Justice Nasim Hasan Shah, writing for the ten justice majority,
held that the Article 58(2)(b) power could only be used when
"[t]he machinery of the Government has broken down completely,
its authority [has] eroded and the government cannot be carried on
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. ' ' 4 Justice
Shah created a two-step process that the President had to follow:
"[f]irst, the President had to form an objective opinion . . based
on some material and factual grounds, which in turn were
judicially reviewable."' 5 "Secondly, if [the President's] objective
opinion was that the government qualified to be dissolved because
it met the test, it was within the President's discretion to dissolve
it. '  Nevertheless, despite finding that Zia's justification for
dissolving the National Assembly did not meet the stringent test
and thus that the dissolution was illegal, the Court was not willing
to restore the Assembly. Without any legal basis and "rather
ambiguously, Justice Shah stated that ... national interest lay in
the holding of elections, rather than in reviving the assemblies."' 07
Though the Court was willing to make legal arguments against
President Zia's dissolution, the interpretation was never truly
enforced and the executive action stood.
The second use of Article 58(2)(b) dissolution was performed
by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on August 6, 1990 to dissolve
the National Assembly led by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.' °8
Unlike General Zia's weakly supported allegations, President
Khan's "order of dissolution [was] precise ... and supported by
103 Id. at 655 (quoting Hafi Saifullah at 190, 194-5).
14 Id. at 654-55, (quoting Hafi Saifullah at 190, 194-5).
105 Id. at 655 (quoting Haft Saifullah at 190, 194-5).
106 Id.
107 Siddique, supra note 17, at 657 (citing Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of
Pak., [1993] 45 PLD 473, 565 (Pak.)). Justice Shah later regretted this decision when he
examined the dissolution of PM Nawaz Sharif's National Assembly in 1993. "On [sic]
hindsight, I now think that after having found the action of dissolution of the National
Assembly was not sustainable in law, the Court should not have denied the consequential
relief and ought to have restored the National Assembly." Id.
108 Siddique, supra note 17, at 659 ("Thus, barely two years after having to sit in
judgment over the fate of a dissolved Assembly, the Pakistani courts found themselves
adjudicating the legality and legitimacy of another dissolution - this time involving a
government that had come to power through the first party-based elections in many
years."). Id.
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documentary evidence."1 °9 In Ahmed Tariq Rahim v. Pakistan,11 o a
twelve judge majority of the Supreme Court upheld the dissolution
order. "Without any preliminary justifications or analysis," the
Court opted for a broader test than the Haji Saifullah precedent."'1
Justice Shafiur Rahman, writing for the majority, "did not explain
why he had departed from the previous [more stringent Haji
Saifullah] test, which was based on precedent and consensus, and
with which he was in full agreement."'"1 2 He created a standard
that allowed the use of Article 58(2)(b) "not just [as] a curative
action, but also a preventative one.'," 3 Defining Article 52(2)(b)
dissolution as "an extreme power, to be exercised where there is
an actual or imminent breakdown of the constitutional
machinery,""' 4 without elaborating upon what those situations
would entail, the Justice left more discretion to "the President's
judgment call ... [based on] a more subjective evaluation of the
state of affairs in the country.""' 5
The Court in Tariq Rahim proved still weaker and less willing
to assert any real power than it was in Haji Saifullah. Any
justification for creating a weaker test that seriously expanded
presidential power was "at worst nonexistent and at best highly
unconvincing, '  and the opinion "barely . . . evaluat[ed] the
substantive content and merit of the actual grounds for
dissolution."" 7 The result was that "it was already becoming clear
that when the judiciary was entrusted with the task of mediating
between confrontational political forces" like the President, Prime
Minister, and the National Assembly, "it was unavoidable for the
judiciary to come out looking tamished.""' 8
The third dissolution occurred when President Khan again
used Article 58(2)(b) to dismiss the National Assembly led by
109 Id. at 659-60.
110 Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. Pakistan, [1992] 44 PLD 646, 684 (Pak.).
111 Siddique, supra note 17, at 665.
112 Id. at 665.
113 Id. at 665, 668.
114 Rahim, 44 PLD at 684 (Pak.).
115 Siddique, supra note 17, at 665.
116 Id. at 671.
117 Id. at 669.
118 Id. at 671.
2010]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.'19 Sharif, previously President
Khan's protrg6, started moving away from his mentor's political
ideology. President Khan responded by dissolving the National
Assembly on April 18, 1993.120 The Supreme Court's subsequent
actions showed the justices' own interest in speaking on the highly
politicized issue. Invoking its original jurisdiction, the Court took
the case before any lower courts. Chief Justice Nasim Hasan Shah
also suggested that the Court had already planned its ruling by
making public statements "to the effect that the Court would reach
a result that would be appreciated by the public. 12'
In arguably "the single most irreconcilable judicial opinion in
all the dissolution cases," Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President
of Pakistan,1 2  Justice Rahman reverted back to the narrower Haji
Saifullah test without even mentioning his own opinion in Tariq
Rahim. 13  Justice Rahman then "conducted [an] . . .exhaustive
analysis" of President Khan's reasoning behind the dissolution and
found it unpersuasive. 124  Not only did the Court find the
dissolution unconstitutional, it went a step further and restored the
dismissed Assembly. 125 Though the result was arguably good in a
democratic sense, concurring opinions showed evidence that the
inexplicable flip to a narrow test was due to members of the
judiciary's "deep political polarizations ...[and] subtle, though
noticeable indications of [the Justices'] personal political
preferences" for Nawaz Sharif 26
119 Id. at 672.
120 Id. at 673.
121 Siddique, supra note 17, at 674.
122 Id. at 675 (citing Muhammad Nawaz Sharifv. President of Pak., [1993] 45 PLD
473 (Pak.)).
123 Id. "Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution empowers the executive head to destroy
the legislature and to remove the chosen representatives. It is an exceptional power
provided for an exceptional situation and must receive as it has in [Hafi Saifullah] the
narrowest interpretation." Id. (quoting Nawaz Sharif, 45 PLD at 579).
124 Id. at 676 (citing Nawaz Sharif, 45 PLD at 630).
125 Id. at 680 (citing Nawaz Sharif, 45 PLD at 570).
126 Id. at 681. Serious allegations against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif received
substantially less attention from the court, "while [Benazir] Bhutto got more than her fair
share of reprimands for lesser crimes" when the Court upheld the dissolution of her
National Assembly. Id. at 676. In reverting to the narrower Haji Saifullah test, Justice
Rahman decided that the President could not claim a deadlock and dismiss the Prime
Minister without first obtaining a vote of no-confidence from the National Assembly.
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The fourth and final dissolution case was a repeat
performance. Benazir Bhutto was reelected to another term as
Prime Minister in 1993 and developed a tense personal and
political relationship with President Farooq Leghari.127  Serious
tensions also arose between Bhutto and Chief Justice Sajjad Ali
Shah, which "started with a disagreement over a judicial
appointment and became progressively worse as the Chief Justice
pronounced unfavorably against several Benazir [judicial]
appointments.' 28 Prime Minister Bhutto was ousted and arrested
by military troops on November 4, 1996; President Leghari used
Article 58(2)(b) to dissolve the National Assembly the next day.129
Through her political statements and policies directed at
judges, Bhutto "had antagonistically pushed the judiciary into a
comer" and Chief Justice Shah "proved to be not above showing
[his resentment] in his judgment.""13 One day before hearing the
case of the second Bhutto dissolution, however, the Court decided
Mahmood Khan Achakzai v. Pakistan,' a challenge to the Eighth
Amendment and Article 58(2)(b) itself. 3 2 The Court unanimously
upheld the Eighth Amendment, arguing that since previous
legislatures had allowed the amendment to stand, there was clear
"ratification by implication."'3 In Benazir Bhutto v. President of
Pakistan,3 4 the Supreme Court upheld the dissolution' using a
See id. (citing Nawaz Sharif, 45 PLD at 616-17). Bhutto overcame a vote of no-
confidence before President Khan dissolved her government, but this "badge of
legitimacy was apparently found to be insufficient for Benazir Bhutto in [Tariq Rahim]."
Id.
127 See Siddique, supra note 17, at 682. "At the height of their strained relationship,
in a veiled attack, Benazir accused [Leghari] and the military intelligence of involvement
in the murder of her brother ...who was gunned down in front of his house in
mysterious circumstances on September 20, 1996." Id. (citing Benazir Bhutto v.
President of Pak., [1998] 50 PLD 388, 482 (Pak.)).
128 Id.
129 See id. at 683.
130 Id. at 684. Bhutto had also "allegedly victimized the Chief Justice's family, and
there was widespread news coverage of a government-sponsored police raid on the house
of the Chief Justice's daughter, with the motive to involve his son-in-law in a corruption
case." Id.
131 Siddique, supra note 17, at 685 (citing Mahmood Khan Achakzai v. Pakistan,
[1997] 49 PLD 426 (Pak.)).
132 Id.
133 Siddique, supra note 17, at 685-86 (quoting Achakzai, 49 PLD at 446 (Pak.)).
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relaxed test somewhere between Haji Saifullah and Tariq Rahim
that showed "benign acceptance of the presidential grounds for
dissolution. '
136
C. Lessons from Article 58(2)(b)
The Article 58(2)(b) cases hardly proved the Pakistan judiciary
to be an independent body that was willing to serve and to ensure
a balance of powers through judgments based on law and logic.
Instead, the decisions were characterized largely by the Justices'
personal political preferences and weak judicial review,
hypothetically used but rarely enforced to overturn executive
action. Though the Court initially placed strict limitations on the
President's use of Article 58(2)(b) in the Haji Saifullah case, this
was largely an academic and theoretical exercise in judicial review
and its logical result was never realized. Then, without any legal
explanation, the Court in Tariq Rahim created a new, deferential
interpretation of Article 58(2)(b) that greatly expanded
presidential power. Furthermore, with no legal explanation, but
with actions that reeked of political preference, the Court reverted
to the strict Haji Saifullah standard to keep its favored Prime
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in office.
The Court's approach to the Nawaz Sharif and second Benazir
Bhutto dissolutions showed that the Court was willing to use
thorough judicial review and even enforce its result to the benefit
or detriment of its preferred candidate. However, the largely
halfhearted judicial review would become characteristic of the
Pakistan judiciary when analyzing executive action, and the
Executive could naturally come to rely on this deference.'37 When
134 Siddique, supra note 17, at 685 (citing Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan,
[1998] 50 PLD 388 (Pak.)).
135 Siddique, supra note 17, at 686. The court first made life difficult for Bhutto.
Her petition was dismissed twice "on flimsy procedural grounds," and "her request for
an early hearing was declined as the Supreme Court first took up less urgent petitions...
and did not cut short its winter break in spite of the prevailing political crisis." Id. at 686-
87. "The press and public opinion largely saw these as unnecessary procedural hurdles
to frustrate Benazir." Id. at 687.
136 Id. at 691.
137 See, e.g., Shah v. Musharraf, [2000] 52 PLD SC 869 (Pak.). "Historically,
Pakistan's judiciary was not known for its independence. Over the previous half century
the courts had frequently been intimidated or induced to support military coups and other
acts contrary to the rule of law, most notably the hanging of the deposed Prime Minister
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first tested by the new regime, the Supreme Court's approach to
Musharraf's coup would provide an example both of this political
deference and Musharraf s successful actions to further tilt the
Court in the Executive's favor.
V. The Supreme Court's Early Deferential Holdings on
Musharraf's Rule
Iftikhar Chaudhry was appointed to the Supreme Court in
February 2000 after serving ten years as a judge in the Balochistan
High Court.138 As a junior justice, "Chaudhry did not betray any
signs of breaking with the past traditions in order to chart an
independent course for himself."' 39 He voted with the majority in
the Zafar Ali Shah case to validate Musharraf's emergency rule
and immunize him from actions taken in connection with the
emergency, and in the Seventeenth Amendment case to uphold the
amendment that increased Executive power. 4 ' These actions left
him "despised" by some of the legal community for making pro-
Executive decisions, and "he was widely criticized for legitimizing
martial law."'' In these two cases, the Supreme Court held to the
Judiciary's tradition of validating army takeovers by affirming the
destruction of civilian rule and securing for Musharraf both
immense executive power and confidence in judicial support.'42
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979." Byrns, supra note 91, at 2.
138 See M. Ilyas Khan, Profile: Ifiikhar Chaudhry, BBC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/6909711 .stm [hereinafter Profile].
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 Aryn Baker, Pakistan's Reluctant Hero, TIME S. PAC., Jun. 25, 2007, at 36, 36-
37, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1632743,00.html.
142 See Siddique, supra note 17, at 622 ("Since its emergence on August 14, 1947,
Pakistan's political and constitutional evolution has been repeatedly interrupted by
praetorian rule through several impositions of martial law - the most recent one imposed
after General Pervez Musharraf's military coup in 1999. Musharraf's coup was
legitimized by the judiciary, which has been habitually relegated to the task of validating
army takeovers through questionable jurisprudence.") Id. "[T]here have been seven
military displacements of civilian governance with military rule since independence." Id.
at 624, n. 25.
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A. Syed Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief
Executive of Pakistan14 3
In the Zafar Ali Shah case, the petitioner challenged "the
validity and legal effect of the army take-over" and the issuance of
General Musharraf's Proclamation of Emergency
(Proclamation), 1" the Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of
1999 (PCO),145 and the Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2000
(Oath). 46 The Proclamation and PCO, as a result of the Senate,
National, and Provisional Assemblies led by Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif were dissolved and the Constitution was held in
abeyance.147 The PCO ordered that the Court could not "call or
permit to be called in question the Proclamation of Emergency...
or any Order made in pursuance thereof," and that "no judgment..
whatsoever shall be made . .. against the Chief Executive
[Musharraf] or any authority designated by him.' 14' The Oath
stated that a Supreme Court judge "shall not continue to hold that
office if he ... does not make [the] Oath.' ' 149 Judges were thus
required to continue to "function and exercise their respective
powers and jurisdiction [only] subject to the Proclamation and
PCO as amended."'"5 Only those justices, including Chaudhry,
who had taken the oath and sworn to uphold Musharraf's orders
heard the Zafar Ali Shah case.' 5'
Petitioners argued that the Proclamation and the PCO were
unconstitutional because they violated the constitutional principle
143 Shah v. Musharraf, [2000] 52 PLD SC 869 (Pak.).
144 Proclamation of Emergency, Oct. 14, 1999 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_12oct99/proclamation-of emergenc
y_14oct1999.html.
145 Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 1999 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_12oct99/pcol_1999.html. The case
concerns the PCO as amended and cited here. Shah, 52 PCD SC 869 (Pak.). The original
PCO was issued on Oct. 15, 1999. See Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 1999
(Pak.), available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/postl12oct99/
pco 1_ 999.orig.html.
146 Shah, 52 PLD SC 869 at 909 (Pak.).
147 Id. at 918, 9.
148 Id. at 913 (quoting Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 1999, §§ 4(1) and
4(2)).
149 Id. at 915 (citing Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2000 Order No. 1 of 2000).
15o Id. at 915-16.
151 See id.
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that State power be exercised only "through the chosen
representatives of the people . . . based on Federalism, [a]
Parliamentary form of Government, [and the] Independence of
[the] Judiciary. ' 5 2 They further argued that the army takeover had
"impaired the judicial trichotomy of powers by eliminating the
Executive, suspending the Legislature, and making an attempt to
curtail the independence of the Judiciary."' 53 The 2000 Oath was
also challenged on the ground that it restricted the Supreme
Court's power of judicial review.'54
First, the Court went through a long and detailed discussion of
the Pakistani judiciary's independence, claiming that the power of
judicial review was inherent and could never be removed by any
legislation.' 5 The Court held that even if the Martial Law Orders
did attempt to take away jurisdiction, the Court still had "the
power of judicial review to judge the validity of any act or action
of the Armed Forces."' 56 The Court also held that "the Superior
Courts continue to function under the Constitution" and that "[t]he
mere fact that the Judges... have taken a new oath under the Oath
of Office (Judges) Order No.1 of 2000, does not in any manner
derogate from this position."' 57  But, while recognizing the
President's power, the Court held that judicial power still existed,
"notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
legislative instrument enacted by the Chief Executive."'5 8 Finally,
the Court could not review the cases of judges who either had not
taken the oath or were not given the oath because they were "past
and closed transaction[s]." 59
Despite its claims of supreme and inherent judicial review, the
Court mostly accepted Musharraf s claims without substantial
analysis. With resounding unanimity, the Supreme Court held that
the army takeover and all three contested orders were legitimate;
152 Shah v. Musharraf, [2000] 52 PLD SC 869,918, 10 (Pak.).
153 Id. at 922, 17.
154 Id. at 1117, 203.
155 Id. at 869.
156 Id. at 1221, 6, § vi.
157 Id. at 1220, 5.
158 Shah, 52 PLD SC 869, at 1221, 6, §vi (Pak.). The Court stated that attempts to
remove jurisdiction "[are] an exercise in futility and the power of judicial review remains
intact." Id. at 872.
159 Id. at 1222, 8.
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the army takeover was "extra-constitutional" but still valid under a
doctrine of "State necessity."' 6 ° The Court agreed with General
Musharraf that the government had completely broken down and
that there was no constitutional solution to the problem since
Article 58(2) had been repealed. 6' The Court held that
Musharraf's actions "as were required for the orderly running of
the State and all acts, which tended to ... promote the good of the
people, [were] also validated.' 6 2  The Court also confirmed
immense power for Musharraf, holding that "as Chief Executive,
having validly assumed power by means of an extra-Constitutional
step, in the interest of the State," he was now entitled to "perform
all such acts and promulgate all legislative measures" that would
achieve his declared objectives, which "tend[ed] to advance or
promote the good of the people," or that were required for "the
ordinary orderly running of the state."' 63
160 Id. at 1219. The Court found that:
[a]ll the elements viz. inevitable necessity; exceptional circumstances; no other
remedy to apply, measures taken being proportionate to the necessity and of
temporary character limited to the necessity and of temporary character limited
to the duration of exceptional circumstances, were present, inasmuch as, the
Constitution provided no solution to meet the extraordinary situation prevailing
on 12th October, 1999 when the Armed Forces took over the affairs of Pakistan.
Id. at 878-79, o. The court also stated that "the Armed Forces had to intervene to save
the State from further chaos, for maintenance of peace and order, economic stability,
justice and good governance and to safeguard integrity and sovereignty of the country
dictated by highest considerations of State necessity and welfare of the people." Id. at
878, 1. Factors contributing to the complete government shutdown included corruption
and mis-declaration of assets by politicians, id. at 875, TT d-e; that the government was
merely an oligarchy, where only a few individuals and families held the reigns of
economic and government power, id. at 876, T g; "general apathy and indifference"
among Pakistani citizens as shown by low voter turnout, id. at 876, h; and attempts to
politicize, destabilize and create dissent in the army that could have resulted in chaos,
anarchy, and an army faction civil war "had the former Prime Minister been successful
in his designs," id. at 883, x.
161 Id. at 1168, T 249. ("After careful analysis . . . we are of the view that it is never
safe to confer unfettered powers on a person who is holding the reins of the affairs of the
country as is embedded in the saying, 'power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely.' Accordingly ... we would like to observe that probably the situation could
have been avoided if checks and balances governing the powers of the President and the
Prime Minister had been in the field by means of Article 58(2)(b).") Id.
162 Id. at 1220, 3.
163 Id. at 1220, 6. Musharraf could also take any act or legislative measure that
could have been made under the 1973 Constitution, including the power to amend the
Constitution. Id. Constitutional amendments could only be made if the Constitution as it
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The Court did provide some limits-Musharraf was required
to hold elections for the National and Provisional Assemblies
within ninety days and achieve his declared objectives within three
years of the October 12, 1999 takeover. 64 The Court also reserved
for itself the power to "re-examine the continuation of the
Proclamation of Emergency ... at any stage if the circumstances
so warrant.' ' 165 The Court concluded, "[T]his is not a case where
old legal order has been completely suppressed or destroyed, but
merely a case of constitutional deviation for a transitional period
so as to enable the Chief Executive to achieve his declared
objectives.' 166
It is not surprising that the Zafar Ali Shah Court validated the
army takeover-after all, the only judges who were allowed to
hear this case were those who had sworn to uphold Musharraf's
rule. 167  The paradox is the passion with which the Court both
proclaims its own authority and supports Musharraf's reasons for
subordinating the entire country to himself and the army. This
deference continues even in the face of a Provisional Constitution
that makes a clear attempt to block the Judiciary's power to act
against the government. What emerges from the Zafar Ali Shah
case is not a system that respects federalism, but rather a judiciary
that touts its own independence while acknowledging that it is
subordinate to the Executive's claims of acting in the national
interest. As Chief Justice Khan wrote, "the power of judicial
review should be exercised with caution,"' 168 and "[j]udges must
stood could not achieve his declared objectives. Id. at 1221, 6. No amendment could
be made to change the "salient features of the Constitution i.e. independence of
Judiciary, federalism, [or the] parliamentary form of Government blended with Islamic
provisions." Id. The "declared objectives" are as stated in Musharraf's speeches on
October 13 and 17, 1999. Id.
164 Shah, 52 PLD SC 869 at 1223, 16. Elections to the National and Provisional
Assemblies were held on October 10, 2002. United Kingdom Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Pakistan, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-
fco/country-profiles/asia-oceania/pakistan?profile=politics&pg=7.
165 Shah, 52 PLD SC 869 at 1223, 18.
166 Id. at 1222, T 13.
167 General Zia-ul-Haq's military rule was also validated by the Supreme Court in
Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of the Army Staff under the same doctrine of state
necessity as was used to validate Musharraf's rule in Zafar Ali Shah. See [1977] PLD
SC 657 (Pak.).
168 Shah, 52 PLD SC 869 at 1123, 215.
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take care not to intrude upon the domain of the other branches of
Government." 69
Moreover, even though the Court argued that the attempt to
limit judicial review is futile and invalid, the fact that the attempt
was made showed that General Musharraf expected such
unquestioning deference from the Judiciary. For all its words, the
Supreme Court demonstrated in this case that it would provide
such deference, even lamenting the repeal of the president-centric
Article 58(2)b, which could have avoided the situation entirely. 7 °
The claims of inherent judicial power were a facade; justices who
had pledged to support the army rule graciously validated it, and
"[w]hatever independence and commitment to constitutional ethos
had been displayed by the Court in some of the early [Article
58(2)b] dissolution judgments seems like ancient, forgotten
history."'
171
B. The Seventeenth Amendment Case172
The Seventeenth Amendment was passed on December 31,
2003, further consolidating and legitimizing Executive power in
General Musharraf.173  By validating the President to Hold
169 Id. (quoting Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan through
Secretary, Interior Division, [1994] SCMR 2142, 12 (Pak.)).
170 See id. at 1168, 249.
171 Siddique, supra note 17, at 699.
172 Judgment on Seventeenth Amendment and President's Uniform Case (2005)
(Pak.), http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user-files/File/JRJudgment-on 17th
Amendmend and Presidents Uniform Case.pdf. [hereinafter JUDGEMENT].
173 See The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan amend. XVII (2003)
(Pak.), available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/
17amendment.html; see also Constitution art. 41 (Pak.); The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan art. 63(1)(d) (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part3.ch2.html [hereinafter Art 63(1)(d)].
The Seventeenth Amendment made the following pertinent amendments to the
Constitution.
Clause (2): Amended Article 41 and stated that Article 63(1)(d) would become
operative on December 31, 2004. See The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan amend. XVII, cl. 2 (2003) (Pak.). Article 63(1)(d) says that "[a] person shall be
disqualified from being elected or chosen as, and from being, a member of [the National
Assembly if] he holds an office of profit in the service of Pakistan other than an office
declared by law not to disqualify its holder." Art. 63(1)(d). Ordinarily, the position of
Chief of Army Staff would have disqualified Musharraf from acting as President under
this Article. However, the date of operation, coupled with the "an office declared by law
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Another Office Act, 2004 (Office Act), 7 4 the Seventeenth
Amendment allowed General Musharraf to hold both the Chief of
Army Staff and President of Pakistan offices, exempting him from
the Constitution's express prohibition of the dual role.'75 It also
validated the Proclamation of Emergency and all orders following
it and immunized Musharraf from any litigation resulting from
those orders.'76  Additionally, the Seventeenth Amendment
validated the 2002 Legal Framework Order, which added the
infamous Article 58(2)(b) dissolution powers back into the
Constitution, and set a sixty-five year retirement age for Supreme
Court justices.'77
not to disqualify its holder" created a loophole which was filled by the President to Hold
Another Office Act, 2004 (Office Act). Id; see also President to Hold Another Office
Act, No. VII (2004) (Pak.), available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan
/legislation/2004/actVIIof2004.html. Enacted on December 31, 2004, the Office Act
allowed the President of Pakistan to also hold the position of Chief of Army Staff, and
declared that such a dual office would not violate Article 63(l)(d). Id. The Act also
explained that this provision was to be valid only for the current President, General
Pervez Musharraf. Id.
Clause (3): Amended Article 58, which had been re-added into the Constitution
by Musharraf's Legal Framework Order, 2002, and added a clause that requires the
President, within fifteen days of dissolving the National Assembly, to refer the
dissolution to the Supreme Court for approval. See The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan amend. XVII, cl. 3.
Clauses (6) and (7): Amended articles 179 and 195, the retirement age of
Supreme Court Justices and High Court Judges was set at sixty five and sixty two,
respectively. See id. cls. 6-7.
Clause (10): Validated and affirmed the Oct. 14, 1999 Proclamation of
Emergency and all orders, appointments, and proceedings made between October 12,
1999 and the date the Seventeenth Amendment would take effect. This included the
Provisional Constitution, Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 1000, the Legal Framework
Order, 2002 (which added Article 58(2)(b) back into the constitution). See id., cl. 10.
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution[, the orders] shall not be called
in question in any court or forum on any ground whatsoever." Id.
174 President to Hold Another Office Act, No. VII (2004) (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/2004/actVIIof2004.html.
175 See The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan amend. XVII (2003)
(Pak.), available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/
17amendment.html; see also The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 41
(Pak.), available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part3.chl.html; The
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 63(l)(d), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part3.ch2.html.
176 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 63(l)(d) (Pak.).
177 Id.
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Petitioners challenged the validity of the Seventeenth
Amendment, the 2002 LFO, the Office Act (2004) and other
supplemental legislations that would give effect to the
Amendment's provisions.' In analyzing the claims, the Supreme
Court limited the scope of its judicial review, arguing that a
constitutional amendment "can be challenged only on one ground,
viz., it has been enacted in a manner not stipulated by the
Constitution itself." 79  The Court held that because Parliament
was properly constituted and General Musharraf's presidency had
been approved at the time the Amendment was made, no
procedural objection could be sustained. 8 ' A substantive
objection was improper for the Court to hear, because "[a]
constitutional amendment posed a political question, which could
be resolved only through the normal mechanisms of parliamentary
democracy and free elections."'81 Even if the amendment violates
"certain salient features of the Constitution, no constitutional
amendment could be struck down by the superior judiciary" on
those grounds.'82
The Court concluded with a sentiment that its hands were tied,
stating that it "must make every attempt to reconcile the statute to
the Constitution and only when it is impossible to do so, must it
strike down the law."' 83 Thus, the Court refused to overturn the
Seventeenth Amendment and its supporting orders, stating that if
they were struck down, "this entire constitutional edifice will
collapse," because all major officers of the country "will cease to
hold office at once." "In short," said the Court, it was "not the
function of the judiciary" to strike down a law where such an
action "would invite chaos and create a constitutional crisis. This
Court must allow the government to function and the institutions
to gain strength and mature with time."' 84
178 See Judgment, supra note 172.
179 Id. at 27, 32.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 43, 57.
182 Id. at 42, 57.
183 Id. at 57, 87.
184 Judgment, supra note 172, at 34-35, 40. The Court further supported its
reasoning: "The very fact that Parliament chose to [insert the provision that Article
63(1)(d) would only come into effect on Dec. 31, 2004, at the same time as the President
to Hold Another Office Act] shows that Parliament did not intend the ban on holding of
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C. The Court Before Chief Justice Chaudhry
The Zafar Ali Shah case and the Seventeenth Amendment
present a paradoxical picture of the Pakistani judiciary. The Court
asserted its inherent power of judicial review in Zafar Ali Shah but
then carved out a very narrow scope in which to operate in the
Seventeenth Amendment. It claimed that it was prevented from
acting by the principles of federalism, but continued to justify
extra-constitutional orders that allowed the President to take power
and act without hindrance from the legislature or judiciary.
Furthermore, though the Court limited its judicial review, claiming
that it was not the Court's place to speak on a political question, it
certainly had no qualms about using strong language to empower
the President. In both instances, the Court uses such strong
language to legitimize and support Musharraf s rule so as to call
into question its purported narrow role, even going so far in the
Zafar Ali Shah case as to lament the repeal of Article 58(2)(b) that
would have consolidated even more power in Musharraf s person.
Thus, the state of the judiciary before Chaudhry became Chief
Justice was one where it at least acquiesced to and at most
staunchly supported expansive executive power, explaining away
difficulties with claims of separation of powers and state necessity.
Extreme deference was given to executive power, leaving the
stage open for the subjugation of the Pakistani government to
General Musharraf's military rule. Neither case is particularly
telling of then Justice Chaudhry's judicial viewpoints, though he
voted with the majority and was criticized for his pro-government
stance.185 He did take the Oath and presided as a justice in both
the Zafar Ali Shah and the Seventeenth Amendment cases (Justice
Irshad Hasan Khan and Justice Nazim Hussain Siddiqui presided
as Chief Justice, respectively). Regardless of what prompted
Chaudhry to take the Oath and vote with the Zafar Ali Shah
majority to validate the takeover, he would soon make it clear that
he was not willing to give Musharraf free reign over the country.
two offices to be absolute ... but instead to be dependent upon the will of Parliament
itself." Id. at 53, 76. The Court described legislation as a political question, saying
that "[tihis Court has consistently held that the wisdom or policy of the legislature is not
open to question in the exercise of the power of judicial review." Id. at 56, T 85.
185 See Profile, supra note 138; Baker, supra note 141.
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VI. The Chaudhry Court: The Rise of Judicial Independence
As a junior justice, Chaudhry was criticized for legitimizing
Musharraf s martial law rule in the Zafar Ali Shah case and other
cases.186 General Musharraf, perhaps encouraged by Chaudhry's
voting record, appointed Chaudhry as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Pakistan on May 7, 2005, personally swearing
him in. 8 7  However, as Chief Justice, Chaudhry "took forceful
action in cases relating to human rights, women and the
environment, often coming down hard on senior police and civil
officials to enforce the relevant laws."'88  In just one year,
Chaudhry had used the Court's original jurisdiction to hear
petitions of over 6,000 human rights cases in Pakistan. 8 9
Musharraf recognized that Chaudhry's new activism might
threaten his chances of running for President, since Musharraf was
still holding the office of Chief of Army Staff and his re-election
would require a constitutional amendment ratified by the Supreme
Court. 9 " On March 9, 2007, Musharraf attempted to dismiss
Chief Justice Chaudhry for "misuse of office."19' The charges
186 See Baker, supra note 141.
187 See Even Detractors Beginning to Admire Iftikhar Chaudhry, DAWN, July 21,
2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/07/21/nat4.htm; HUM. RTs. WATCH, supra note 28, at
16.
188 M. Ilyas Khan, Judge Row Prompts Pakistan Democracy Questions, BBC NEWS,
Mar. 12, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/6442829.stm. After the attempted
dismissal in March 2007, Chaudhry gave an interview to a Pakistani newspaper, Dawn.
He discussed the petitions he had accepted and heard as Chief Justice, including those
against rising oil and pharmaceutical prices[,] ... preventing public parks being
converted into exclusive (mini) golf clubs or commercial complexes [,] . . .
prohibiting the cutting of forests in the construction of an elitist township[,]...
instituting inquiries into disappearances, providing relief to rape victims, [and]
banning forced marriages and the exchange of girls and women to settle
disputes according to local customs.
Shehar Bano Khan, I am Innocent, Want Open Trial. Justice Iftikhar, DAWN, Mar. 23,
2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/23/topl .htm [hereinafter I am Innocent].
189 1 am Innocent, supra note 188. There had been a severe backlog of cases at the
Supreme Court, and Chaudhry worked overtime to clear the docket. Profile, supra note
138; Khan, Judge Row Prompts Pakistan Democracy Questions, supra note 188.
190 See Baker, supra note 141.
191 HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 12; Text of Reference against CJ, DAWN,
March 21, 2007, http://dawn.com/2007/03/21/nat2.htm. For fuller summaries of the
reference against Chaudhry and his Affidavit in response, see Suspension and
Reinstatement of the Chief Justice of Pakistan: From Judicial Crisis to Restoring
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against Chaudhry included nepotism, demanding the use of
official transportation, and writing orders that conflicted with what
he previously stated in open court.'92 Chaudhry was summoned to
the Army House, General Musharraf's official residence, and
questioned about his actions in the presence of Prime Minister
Shaukat Aziz and other uniformed officials.'93 However, Chief
Justice Chaudhry challenged the charges against him and refused
to resign.'94 Thereafter, on March 13, 2007, the Supreme Court
held a hearing to determine the validity of the charges against
Chaudhry.'95 On July 20, 2007, the Supreme Court threw out the
charges against Chaudhry and reinstated him, declaring that
Musharraf's order restraining Chaudhry from holding the office of
Chief Justice was "illegal.' 96
Judicial Independence? LAW LIBR. OF CONG., Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/pakistan-justice.php [hereinafter Suspension and
Restatement].
192 See Text of Reference against CJ, supra note 191, § II, 1, 31, 34.
193 See Khan, Judge Row Prompts Pakistan Democracy Questions, supra note 188;
Suspension and Reinstatement, supra note 191. "Observers believe that [this factor]
played a decisive role in elevating him from the realm of the ordinary to the status of a
hero." Profile: Iftikahr Chaudhry, supra note 138.
194 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 12. See also Masood, supra note 44.
195 Pakistan Panel Quizzes Top Judge, BBC NEWS, Mar. 13, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/6444355.stm. "[The] Supreme Judicial Council
(SJC) [is] a five-member body of senior judges empowered to probe the conduct of their
peers." Khan, Judge Row Prompts Pakistan Democracy Questions, supra note 188.
Originally, the Supreme Judicial Council began to hear the case. However, three of the
five judges on the SJC were "hand-picked" pro-government judges who "would have
ruled against [Chaudhry]." Chaudhry petitioned and won the right to have his case heard
by the whole Supreme Court. See Somini Sengupta, Chief Justice Is Reinstated in
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007
/07/20/world/asia/20cnd-pakistan.html. The final short order was 10-3 in favor of
reinstating Chaudhry. Short Order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding
Constitutional Petition No. 21 of 2007 filed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan (July 20,
2007) (Pak.), available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/
events/cjpref_2007/scref order.html [hereinafter Short Order].
196 Short Order, supra note 195. There were calls for the government to apologize
to Chaudhry. M. Ilyas Khan, Musharraf Faces Legal Nightmare, BBC NEWS, July 20,
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/6909279.stm. Wasim Shah, a Dawn
newspaper legal correspondent, explained the sentiment among the Pakistan legal
community: "The court has completely demolished the government's case and has put an
uncomfortable question mark on its moral standing .... In coming days, the government
will fmd it increasingly difficult to deny that it tried to get rid of a constitutional office
holder with malafide intentions." Id.
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In addition to the resounding verdict reinstating Chaudhry,
another victory occurred-a powerful boost to the confidence of
the Pakistani legal community as a whole.'97 The March 9, 2007
dialogue between Chaudhry, Musharraf, and Prime Minister
Shaukat Aziz was broadcast on national television, "meant to
show the nation that even the Chief Justice was not above the
law." Musharrafs ploy backfired and the attempt to fire Chief
Justice Chaudhry "unleashed outrage against the military." '198
Thousands of lawyers in black suits and ordinary Pakistani
citizens took to the streets in protest; commentators called
Chaudhry the "judge who said no."' 99
Musharraf s attempt to discredit Chaudhry had exactly the
opposite effect, 2°° and the increase in support for Chaudhry
corresponded with the unprecedented "rate of evaporation of
support for Musharraf., 21' Before the suspension, Chaudhry was
most known for his initiative in questioning the government's
privatization of the Pakistan Steel Mills and its secretive terrorism
detentions.20 2 With renewed vigor after his reinstatement, he
continued to hear petitions on disappeared persons and led the
Judiciary's challenge to Musharraf's election to the Presidency
while the General still held the position of Chief of Army Staff.203
A. Pakistan Steel Mills Case20 4
The state-owned Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (PSMC)2°5
197 Khan, Musharraf Faces Legal Nightmare, supra note 196.
198 Baker, supra note 141.
199 Id. Supreme Court advocate Athar Minallah said, "It's not about the Chief
Justice anymore. It's about the future of this country. It's about having systems, having
institutions that are not dependent on individuals. It's all now about democracy." Id.
200 Profile, supra note 138.
201 Baker, supra note 141 (quoting Asan lqbal, Secretary of Information for the
Pakistan Muslim League).
202 Profile, supra note 138; I am Innocent, supra note 188. "I was also going to look
into the privatization of the Habib Bank," said Chaudhry. Id.
203 Carlotta Gall & Salman Masood, Pakistan Released Qaeda Suspect as Case Was
To Be Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, at A9; Profile, supra note 138.
204 Watan Party and Pakistan Steel People's Workers Union, et al. v. Federation Of
Pakistan, [2006] PLD SC 697 (Pak.), Constitutional Petition No. 9 of 2006, Civil
Petition No. 345, 349 of 2006 , available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/
userfiles/File/CJDPakistanSteelMillsCase.pdf [hereinafter Steel Mills].
205 See Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Website, http://www.paksteel.com.pk (last
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was the biggest producer of steel in Pakistan. Though the
company was initially financially weak, a restructuring of its
operations greatly increased its financial standing. °6  The
undervalued sale was a "pet project" of Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz, °7 who headed the Cabinet Committee on Privatization. The
eventual purchaser, Arif Habib, was allegedly an associate or
friend of the Prime Minister.0 8 From the beginning, Chief Justice
Chaudhry's decision in Pakistan Steel Mills showed his
willingness to broaden the statutory interpretation and the scope of
judicial review to encompass as much of the contested government
action as possible. Chief Justice Chaudhry accepted the petition
using suo motu jurisdiction, a part of the Court's original
jurisdiction which allows the Court to accept a case "on the
application of any aggrieved party" if the matter is of public
importance and no other adequate remedy exists.20 9 Chaudhry
used case precedent to broaden the scope of both of these elements
visited Feb. 2, 2010).
206 Steel Mills, supra note 204 at 4-5, 3.
207 Baker, supra note 141.
208 This contention has been made multiple times in the Pakistani media. See, e.g.,
Syed A. Mateen, Non-Political Prime Minister, PAK TRIBUNE, Apr. 10, 2007,
http://paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?174716. Though the author could not find any
substantiated statement by the Prime Minister himself, the fact that this general
sentiment exists shows that Pakistanis were skeptical about the sale. Protests marked the
widespread discontentment with the sale. See, e.g., Pakistan Steel's Sale Criticized:
Protest Drive Planned, DAWN, Apr. 3, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/
2006/04/03/local8.htm.
209 See Constitution arts. 184, 199 (Pak.). The Supreme Court may invoke original
jurisdiction under Article 184(3) if it considers the matter to be of public importance
with respect to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights (Part II, Ch 1). Under Article
199(1), "if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law," the Supreme
Court may "on the application of any aggrieved party" issue upon any party, including
the Government, an injunction or an order to act, or even void an action already taken. A
writ of habeas corpus provision also appears in Article 199(l)(b). See also Maryam
Khan & Osama Siddique, The 2005 South Asian Earthquake: Natural Calamity or
Failure of State? State Liability and Remedies for Victims of Defective Construction in
Pakistan, 9 AUSTL. J. ASIAN. L. 187, 216 (2007) ("Article 184(3) of the Constitution
enshrines the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and also grants it suo motu
powers to intervene in areas of 'public importance' for the enforcement of the
Fundamental Rights. The Supreme Court may utilize the same powers as the High
Courts to issue various writs, as well as their power to issue any order to any person for
the enforcement of any Fundamental Rights .... Over the past almost three decades,
these provisions of the Constitution have been extensively invoked for rights
protection."). Id.
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and argued that "petitioner cannot be refused relief and penalized
for not throwing himself again (by way of revision or review [as
other petitions had been unsuccessful or denied]) on [the] mercy of
authorities who are responsible for such excesses."2 '
The government, through Aziz's Cabinet Committee on
Privatization, had decided to privatize PSMC and had begun to
value the shares, publicize information, and solicit bids for
PSMC.21" ' A consortium of three companies, Magnitogorsk Iron &
Steel Works, Al-Tuwairqi Group, and Arif Habib Group, bought
75% of the stock for Rs 21.68 billion (approximately $362
million) at Rs 16.80 per share.212 The consortium also achieved
management control of PSMC. 23  Petitioner, the Pakistan Steel
Peoples Workers Union, brought suit against the Government of
Pakistan. The main contentions were against the transparency and
propriety of the sale process, namely (a) that the privatization
package was improperly amended once a final sale had been
approved by the Council of Common Interest; (b) that only the
three individual buyers and not the consortium had been approved
as buyers; and (c) that PSMC had been grossly undervalued as an
incentive to the consortium.214
Chaudhry continued his expansive interpretation of issues
throughout the case. He conceded that "in exercise of the power
of judicial review, the courts normally will not interfere in pure
policy matters (unless the policy itself is shown to be against
210 Steel Mills, supra note 204 at 18, 26. "[I]f an adequate remedy provided by
law is less convenient, beneficial and effective in [the] case of a legal right to
performance of a legal duty, the jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked." Id.
(citing Anjuman-e-Ahmadiya, Sarghoda v. Dy Commissioner Sarghoda, PLD 1966 SC
639 (1966) (Pak.)). "[I]f a statutory functionary acts mala fide or in a partial, unjust and
oppressive manner the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction has power to grant
relief to the aggrieved party." Steel Mills, supra note 204 at 18-19, 26 (citing Murree
Brewery Co. v. Pakistan, PLD 1972 SC 279 (1972) (Pak.)).
211 See Steel Mills, supra note 204 at 5-8.
212 See id. at 10, 11; Nasir lqbal, Court Seeks Evaluation of PSM's Market Value,
DAWN, May 31, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/2006/05/31/top5.htm.
213 See Iqbal, supra note 212; see also Steel Mills, supra note 204 at 53, 63.
214 See Steel Mills, supra note 204 at 7-11. Respondents agreed that the approval of
the CCI was required for any privatization of industrial units owned by the Federal
Government. Id. at 12, 16. There were several discrepancies between the Privatization
Commission's original public offers and the final package of incentives and concessions
offered to the successful bidder. Id. at 8, 8.
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Constitution and the law) nor impose its own opinion in the
matter" and that "while exercising power of judicial review [the
Court] may not express opinions on... issues requiring technical
expertise and specialized knowledge., 215  But Chaudhry reframed
the issue so that it was no longer a political question, arguing "[i]n
the instant case, however, we are seized not with a [technical]
issue as such but with the legality, reasonableness and
transparency of the process of privatization. . . . These are well
established basis for [the] exercise of judicial review. 21 6
The Court addressed both the process of valuing the PSMC
and the purchase and sale itself in order to determine the validity
and transparency of the sale. 17 At the onset, Chaudhry recognized
that, according to the Privatization Ordinance of 2000, which
allowed the sale, "it should have been the endeavor of on the part
of the Privatization Commission to . . . fetch [the] highest price"
possible for the company.1 8 Instead, the valuation did not include
the land21 9 upon which PSMC rested and its assets were grossly
understated.22 °  Though the Privatization Commission
215 Id. at 42, 58.
216 Id. (emphasis added). Chaudhry also wrote that "[w]e are conscious of the fact
that the courts are not supposed to settle the controversy as to which method should have
been followed by the valuer for the purpose of determining the value of shares ....
However, we can look into the models of valuation internationally recognized to
ascertain [proper models]." Id. at 53, 64.
217 Id. at 47-48, 61. The Privatization Ordinance of 2000 provides the basic rules
allowing for and regulating the privatization of an industry. Valuation is to be conducted
in accordance with the Privatization Commission Valuation Rules, 2001. Pre-
qualification of potential bidders is to be conducted in accordance with the rules of the
Privatization Commission Regulations. Id.
218 Id. at 48, 62. See also id. At 78-79, 94 ("The decision of CCI . . . explicitly
provides that the object of privatization would be to retire the debts and this policy has
been incorporated in the [Privatization] Ordinance of 2000, as well. Therefore, if the
P.C. wanted to sell the shares of PSMC for any other purpose i.e. to build its capacity for
the purpose of catering the requirements of steel in the country then in that case they
should have again approached the CCI for the purpose of modification if its policy. ...
[H]owever, the only object should be the debt retirement and for this purpose the
government may apply any such formula internationally recognized which may ensure to
bring more money in the country.")
219 Id. at 50, 63.
220 Steel Mills, supra note 204 at 54-55, 67. The reports prepared by the valuer,
City Group, "had calculated the discounted cash flow from 2006 onward without having
regard to the fact that after restructuring in the year 2002-3 the PSMC did increase its
profitability and the [Privatization Committee] while publishing the notices for
2010]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXV
recommended a price of Rs. 17.43 per share,221 the CCOP decided
on a price of Rs. 16.18 per share.22 Furthermore, the CCOP
approved "huge" incentives for the final buyer that were not
included in the initial public offering, including payment of loans
and acceptance of legal liability for workers' claims by the
Government of Pakistan.223
The Court also held that the approval of the Consortium was
improper; procedural irregularities hinted at a result-driven
approval process skewed in favor of Arif Habib.224 The CCOP and
Privatization Commission knew that Arif Habib was involved in
nine civil and criminal cases; this questioned his corporate
credentials and should have disqualified him, but the issue was not
discussed by the groups. 22' Last, in the final contract, the eventual
purchasers were different from the initial bidderp-while the
consortium consisted of Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel Works, Al-
Expression of Interest in the newspapers had shown the statement of positive financial
condition." Id. at 55, 67. In fiscal year 2004-5, PSMC had a net profit of 6 billion
Rupees. After it was restructured, the company also paid off the principal amount of its
11.35 billion Rupees debt. "Therefore under these circumstances it was incumbent upon
the Privatization Commission [to ensure that it was] mentioned categorically in the
Terms of Reference framed [for the valuer that the PSMC] is [an] ongoing profitable
concern and it has marketable assets and the liabilities are much less than the assets." Id.
221 Id. at 59, 72. Rs. 17.43 = $.29 per share, calculated at an exchange rate of Rs.
60 per I US$.
222 Id. at 60, 73, (quoting the CCOP decision of March 31, 2006). The CCOP
authorized the sale of 75% of equity stock in PSMC, i.e. 1,290,487,275 shares at a price
of Rs. 16.18 per share, totaling US $348 million. id.
223 Id. at 63, 76.
224 Id. at 69-70, 86. The buyers had been approved individually, but not as a
Consortium as the Privatization Commission rules required. Id. Furthermore, the CCOP
authorized the Privatization Commission to accept any offer "if [the bidder's] per share
price is equal or higher than the Reference Price," even though the CCOP is not
supposed to delegate its responsibility of accepting offers to the Privatization
Commission. Id. at 59, 72.
225 Id. at 70-72, 87. Paragraph 2.20) of the Request for Statement of Qualification
could have disqualified him.
"[H]is involvement in litigation was in the knowledge of the Privatization
Commission. Thus, it had a duty to have [considered the matter] before
declaring him qualified ... [because] a person who is involved in litigation in
respect of the matter which pertains to a corporate body ... and against whom a
report publicly has also been issued ... could not be considered a person who
could, prima facie, handle the affairs of the Pakistan Steel Mills transparently."
Id. at 72, T 87.
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Tuwairqi Group, and Arif Habib Group, the final contract was
between the Government of Pakistan, Arif Habib Securities
Limited, and Arif Habib himself.
226
Summarizing the valuation and approval procedures,
Chaudhry stated that the process "reflected indecent haste" by the
Privatization Commission and the CCOP. 227  and that "this
unexplained haste casts reasonable doubt on the transparency of
the whole exercise., 228 The entire process of privatization, from
the initial proposal by the Pakistani Government to the final
valuation report to the eventual sale, occurred within two days.229
Chaudhry also stated that CCOP's decision "betrays total
disregard of the rules and the relevant material" and thus "fails the
test of reasonableness laid down ... for the exercise of the power
of judicial review., 23' He also reflected a sense of duty, stating
that when "[f]aced with such a situation a Constitutional Court
would be failing in its Constitutional duty if it does not interfere to
rectify the wrong more so when valuable assets of the nation are at
stake. 231  The Court's final holding invalidated the sale and
purchase of the Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation.232
This was an embarrassing result for General Musharraf and
Prime Minister Aziz.233 Musharraf's reaction to this ruling can be
226 Steel Mills, supra note 204 at 74, 90. Magnitogorsk and Al-Tuwairgi Group
(ATG) were merely guarantors ofArifHabib. Id.
227 Id. at 66, 82.
228 Id.
229 See id. The Financial Advisor presented the final valuation report to the
Privatization only one day before the bidding date instead of the required six weeks, an
action which "deprived the PC to assess the report independently and the CCOP of a
well considered and independent comment on the said report" from the PC. Id. at 57, T
69. Within two days, the final report of the valuer was received, the PC met to
summarize the report for the CCOP, and the CCOP fixed a per share price and
authorized the PC to approve any bids higher than that price. See id. at 66, 82. "This
transaction is [an] outcome of a process reflecting [a] serious violation of law and gross
irregularities with regard to sale of the first and the biggest steel mill that this country
has. From the facts admitted before us, even the procedural irregularities are not
disputed." Id. at 65, 78.
230 Id. at 62, T 75. The CCOP decision "reflect[ed] disregard of the mandatory rules
[and] all material which was essential for arriving at a fair reference price." Id. at 61,
74.
231 Id. at 62, 74.
232 Steel Mills, supra note 204, at 3.
233 Khan, Judge Row Prompts Pakistan Democracy Questions, supra note 188.
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seen in the Proclamation of Emergency promulgated on November
3, 2007. The Proclamation claims that emergency rule is justified
because of the "increasing interference by some members of the
judiciary in government policy, adversely affecting economic
growth" and the "weaken[ing of] the writ of the government [by].
. .constant interference in executive functions, including .. .
economic policy, price controls, [and] downsizing of
corporations. ' '21 Chief Justice Chaudhry later related that the
Pakistan Steel Mills decision brought the ire of General Musharraf
and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz upon him; Aziz told Chaudhry
that "Musharraf was 'very angry' with him." But Chaudhry would
not budge: "I told the prime minister in very categorical terms that
I had no business to appease anybody and had decided the case in
accordance with the Constitution and the law.,
235
B. Terrorism Cases
In 2001, as an ally in the US-led War on Terror, Pakistan
began to arrest and detain citizens and foreign nationals who were
suspected to be linked to terrorist activities. 36 Political opponents
of the Pakistani government, such as activists or minority ethnic
groups demanding more rights from the federal government,
''were [especially targeted as] victims of enforced
disappearance. '  They were "arbitrarily detained ... , denied
access to lawyers,... and held in undeclared places of detention
run by Pakistan's intelligence agencies, with the government
concealing their fate or whereabouts.""23  When asked about
enforced disappearances, General Musharraf responded, "I don't
want even to reply to that, it is nonsense, I don't believe it, I don't
234 Proclamation of Emergency, Nov. 3, 2007 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/
pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/proclamation emergency_20071103.html.
235 Nasir Iqbal & Mudassir Iqbal Raja, Iftikhar Hits Out at Musharraf and Aziz,
DAWN, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.dawn.com/2008/11/04/top4.htm.
236 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3, at 9. For more about Pakistan's terrorism human
rights violations, see also AMNESTY INT'L, Pakistan: Working to Stop Human Rights
Violations in the "War on Terror," Dec. 8, 2006, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/ASA33/051/2006/en/847e2a08-d3cd- 11 dd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/asa3305
12006en.pdf.
237 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3, at 9; Baker, supra note 141.
238 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3, at 9.
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trust it.'
239
In the face of Musharraf's denials, Chaudhry's willingness to
stretch the traditional Pakistani judicial role continued when he led
the charge to take General Musharraf and the military to task on
the secret terrorism detentions.24 ° In December 2005, the Supreme
Court took judicial notice of a newspaper article about the
"enforced disappearance" of an activist and began to challenge the
Pakistani government about his and other enforced
disappearances.241  Even after Chaudhry was temporarily
suspended in March 2007, the other Supreme Court justices
continued to hear missing persons cases.242 Chaudhry rejoined his
colleagues in the cause when reinstated on July 20, 2007.243 The
Supreme Court continued to take suo motu notice of
disappearances and held regular hearings to determine the
whereabouts of the detainees; 2" between October 2006 and
November 2007, the Supreme Court traced at least 186
disappeared people.245
Supreme Court justices claimed that no government official
would escape scrutiny. Chief Justice Chaudhry, in his
characteristic style of direct, demanding questioning, told the
director-general of the Federal Investigation Agency, "[the
prisoner] must be produced today or you will be sent to the lock-
up. 246  The Court also began issuing orders to government
239 Id. Human rights groups claim that under previous administrations, "there were
one or two cases [of disappearances], but not the systematic disappearances by the
intelligence agencies under Musharraf." Carlotta Gall, Picture of Secret Detentions
Emerges in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at Al.
240 Khan, Judge Row Prompts Pakistan Democracy Questions, supra note 188. A
commendation must be given to Ms. Amina Masood Janjua, the wife of a detainee who
founded the Defense of Human Rights, which, along with the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan, is working on locating and obtaining justice for the missing
people. According to Ms. Janjua, "[i]t used to be two cases every week .... Today,
there were three. The numbers are incredible. I get cases when I'm driving. I have
three diaries full of names." Jane Perlez, Pakistani Wife Embodies Cause of
'Disappeared,'N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2007, at Al.
241 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3, at 5.
242 Perlez, supra note 240.
243 Gall & Masood, supra note 203.
244 See SC Orders Production of Man in I Custody, DAWN, June 7, 2007,
http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/07/top6.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
245 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3, at 5.
246 Syed Shoaib Hasan, Security Chief Gets Jail Warning, BBC NEWS, Aug. 20,
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officials to appear before the Court and to locate the disappeared
people. 47 Each missing person's case brought before the court
was individually researched to determine the person's
whereabouts.248 Chaudhry made it clear, however, that his goal
was not to release guilty people, but to ensure that each detainee
was ensured his rights and that the families of the missing persons
could know the missing person's location. 4 9 "We are not asking
for immediate release of the disappeared, but want legal
proceedings according to the law by regularizing the arrest of
people who had later gone missing," said Chaudhry 5 °
The last case on enforced disappearances was heard on
November 1, 2007, two days before Musharraf declared a state of
emergency on November 3, 2007.251 Analysts comment that "the
timing of the proclamation of emergency and of the dismissal of
judges of the higher judiciary coincided with the increasingly
insistent demands of the Supreme Court to call high officials of
the intelligence agencies to testify. '' 25 2  Similar to the results of
Pakistan Steel Mills Case, the animosity between Musharraf and
Chaudhry resulting from the prosecutions was again apparent from
the Proclamation of Emergency: "Some members of the judiciary
[are] working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature
in the fight against terrorism and extremism thereby weakening
the government., 253
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/6955329.stm.
247 Declan Walsh, Without A Trace, DAWN, Mar. 17, 2007,
http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/17/fea.htm. The Court issued an order to find forty-one
disappeared people. Barbara Plett, Painful Search for Pakistan's Disappeared, BBC
NEWS, Dec. 13, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/6177057.stm.
248 Hasan, supra note 246.
249 Gall, supra note 239.
250 Nasir Iqbal, 'Produce the Missing Or Go To Jail': SC Warns FIA Chief, DAWN,
Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/08/21/topl.htm.
251 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 3, at 5.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 11; see also Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 2007, supra note 7;
Ihtasham ul Haque, Emergency to End Judicial Activism, DAWN, Nov. 4, 2007,
http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/topl2.htm (arguing that the judiciary's activism was
hampering government efforts to combat terrorism, Musharraf said, "[o]ver 100 suo
motu cases are being heard by the Supreme Court, besides thousands of applications
against the executive were being entertained due to which the government's system has
collapsed totally."). Id.
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C. Musharraf's Re-election to the Presidency
The Supreme Court's reaction to Musharraf's candidacy for
and re-election to the Presidency in 2007 was the culmination of
the continuous battles with the Judiciary. By now, Chaudhry had
made his impact; the Supreme Court had already shown that it was
willing to continue challenging the Executive in his absence, and
the legal community had poured into the streets to support judicial
independence. In a very short period of time, Musharraf would
repeat a sequence of events similar to his 1999 coup in order to
ensure his position as President.
Musharraf s term as President was to expire on November 15,
2007, and he planned to run for re-election while still holding the
position of Chief of Army Staff.2 54  His main obstacle to this
arrangement lay in Chief Justice Chaudhry and the Supreme
Court's final decision on whether Musharraf's position as Army
Chief made his candidacy for President unconstitutional. 5
Musharraf planned to resign the army post only after he was
elected President by the National and Provincial Assemblies.
25 6
His advisors predicted the tension and recommended this plan of
action, so that in case "the chief justice attack[ed] him, he [could]
stay as army chief. 257 Opposition parties filed petitions opposing
254 Carlotta Gall, Political Ally Says Musharraf to Quit Top Army Post, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/0 1/world/asia/
Olpakistan.html. The provision in the Seventeenth Amendment that approved the
President to Hold Another Office Act, which allowed him to hold the dual role, was to
expire on December 31. Id.
255 Id. Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Musharraf's advisor and president of the ruling
political party, openly stated his feelings about "vengeful" Chief Justice Chaudhry:
"Whenever we try to think of some allowance, at once the chief justice comes in front."
Hussain added that efforts were under way to reach out to Mr. Chaudhry, who "should
behave like a judge." Hussain also lamented that Musharrafs reputation had been
damaged by the attempt to suspend Chaudhry, but he was hopeful that Musharraf would
be re-elected, saying, "[e]xcept for this judicial crisis, we were going in a very good
way." Id.; see also Carlotta Gall, Even Musharraf's Allies Question His Re-Election
Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.corn/2007/08/17/
world/asia17pakistan.html [hereinafter Re-Election Goal]. Ishaq Khan Khakwani, the
minister of state for information technology and telecommunication, said, "I think it is
very difficult for [Musharraf] to get through the question of eligibility .... I wish that he
would get through, but there are too many ifs and buts." Id.
256 Musharraf to 'Quit as Army Chief,' BBC NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/6998210.stm.
257 Gall, supra note 254.
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Musharraf's candidacy,258 but the Supreme Court, in a nine-
member bench headed by Justice Rana Bhagwandas, allowed
Musharraf to take part in the election. 59 However, the Court also
ruled that the Election Commission could not certify the results
until a final decision was reached on Musharrafs candidacy.
260
This prevented Musharraf from taking the oath of office even if
the election went in his favor.26'
On October 6, 2007, the assemblies elected Musharraf
President after a boycott by opposition parties; as ordered, the
Election Commission did not certify the result.262 After hearing
lengthy opposition challenges to Musharraf's election, an eleven-
member panel headed by Justice Javed Iqbal decided to delay a
planned hearing and ruling on the issue until November 12, three
days before Musharraf's term was to expire.263
Delivering the resolution on November 1, 2007, Justice Iqbal
warned the government against any extreme action, saying "no
group should think that it can take the Supreme Court hostage,"
and "[n]o threat will have any effect on this bench, whether it is
martial law or [a state of] emergency ... Whatever will happen, it
258 Musharraf's Candidature Challenged in SHC, SC, DAWN, Oct. 2, 2007,
http://www.dawn.com/2007/10/02/top2.htm.
259 Ghulam Hasnain, Judges Ruling on General Faced Sex Blackmail, TIMES
ONLINE, Nov. 11, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
asia/article2848490.ece. Some analysts claim that the Court acted under political
pressure and personal blackmail, including secretly taped sexual trysts. 'The message
was clear,' said a British barrister who was told about the tapes by a Pakistani
counterpart. 'If you rule the wrong way, these [tapes] will become public and your
family destroyed."' Id.
260 Iftikhar A. Khan, SC Keeps Musharraf's Fate in its Hands; Go-ahead for
Presidential Election, DAWN, Oct. 6, 2007, http://dawn.com/2007/10/06/topl.htm; see
also Raja Asghar, Musharraf Steals the Show, but Victory Hangs on Court, DAWN, Oct.
7, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/10/07/topl.htm; HUM. RTS. WATCH, Pakistan:
Election Commission Not Impartial, Feb. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/02/1 0/pakistan-election-commission-not-impartial.
(agg the Pakistan Election Commission was not impartial due in part to being
controlled by Musharraf appointees.) Id.
261 HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 18.
262 Musharraf Imposes Emergency Rule, BBC NEws, Nov. 3, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7076670.stm.
263 Musharraf Court Ruling 'Delayed,' BBC NEWS, Nov. 1, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7072899.stm.
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will be according to the constitution and rules., 264  However, on
November 2, Justice Iqbal announced that the Court would
continue hearings "because of the climate of political
uncertainty., 265  Justice Iqbal's words proved an inadequate
warning; even international voices sensed the tensions between the
Executive and the legal community, whose armies of black-suited
lawyers had been protesting in the streets since Musharraf s
candidacy was allowed.266 Amid circulating drafts of a provisional
constitutional order allowing emergency rule, US Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice spoke out against any "extra-
constitutional means" of government.267
On November 3, 2007, Musharraf declared a state of
emergency and held the Constitution in abeyance.268 Apart from
two clauses citing a general increase in terrorism, the Proclamation
of Emergency placed the blame upon the judiciary for "working at
cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight
against terrorism," "interfer[ing] . . . in government policy,
adversely affecting economic growth," and "constant interference
in executive functions" that demoralized the police force. 269 The
proclamation also stated that while "the Government is committed
to the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law and holds
the superior judiciary in high esteem, it is nonetheless of
paramount importance that the Honourable Judges confine the
scope of their activity to the judicial function and not assume
charge of administration.
270
Mimicking the setup to the Zafar Ali Shah case, a new Oath of
264 Id.
265 Mark Tran, Court Speeds Up Musharraf Election Challenge, THE GUARDIAN,
Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/02/usa.pakistan.
266 See Re-Election Goal, supra note 255. Pakistan's bar associations started a
nationwide campaign in support of Chaudhry during the suspension controversy. They
began a new campaign on September 1, 2007 against Musharraf's election. Id.
267 Jane Perlez, Musharraf Warned Not to Impose Emergency Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/03/world/
asia/03pakistan.html. Tariq Azim Khan, a minister of state, resented the interference,
saying "Condoleezza Rice [has] no right to intervene in Pakistan's internal matters" and
"[t]he whole world knows that the United States unnecessarily interferes in Pakistan."
Id.
268 See Proclamation of Emergency (Pak.), supra note 234.
269 Id.
270 Id.
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Office (Judges) Order was promulgated and all federal judges
were automatically suspended until they swore to uphold the
Proclamation of Emergency and the PCO No. 1 of 2007.271 Chief
Justice Chaudhry responded quickly on the evening of November
3, heading a seven-justice panel to pass an emergency order
annulling the Provisional Constitutional Order, directing all judges
not to take the new Oath of Office to uphold it, and restraining
military officers from following the decree.272 Shortly thereafter,
Chief Justice Chaudhry and other judges who refused to take an
oath to uphold the new PCO were placed under house arrest.
273
By proclaiming emergency rule, General Musharraf had "fired
the entire Supreme Court" and many of the High Court Judges;
specifically, he had restrained them under house arrest and
replaced them with judges who had taken a new oath to uphold his
emergency rule. 274  Now protected from Chaudhry and the
Judiciary who had been ruling against him, Musharraf resigned his
271 Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007 (Pak.), available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/judges-oathorder_2007.h
tmnl.
A person holding office immediately before this Order as Judge of the Supreme
Court, the Federal Shariat Court, or a High Court shall cease to hold that office
with immediate effect [unless the Oath is made] ... [A Judge] who has made
Oath as required by these clauses shall be bound by the provisions of this Order,
the Proclamation of Emergency of the 3rd day of November, 2007, the
Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 2007, and notwithstanding any
judgment of any court, shall not call in question or permit to be called in
question the validity of any of the provisions thereof. Id.
272 The Supreme Court Verdict on the Proclamation of Emergency (Pak.), available
at http://www.pakistanconstitution-law.com/sc /20verdict/20on/20pe.asp (last visited
Feb. 2, 2010) (presiding on the panel were Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, Justice Rana
Bbagwandas, Justice Javed Iqbal, Justice Mian Shakirullah Jan, Justice Nasirul Mulk,
Justice Raja Fayyaz, and Justice Ghulam Rabbani); see also Mohammed Saleem, Seven
Judges Reject PCO Before Being Sent Home, DAwN, Nov. 4, 2007,
http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/top2.htm ("Copies of the order were sneaked out to
the awaiting newsmen outside the court premises.").
273 Saleem, supra note 272.
274 Jane Perlez & David Rohde, Pakistan Attempts to Crush Protests by Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/world/
asia/06pakistan.html; see also Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007 (Pak.), supra note
271 (requiring that a judge, "who has made Oath ... shall be bound by the provisions of
this Order, the Proclamation of Emergency of the 3rd day of November, 2007, the
Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 2007, and notwithstanding any judgment of
any court, shall not call in question or permit to be called in question the validity of any
of the provisions thereof.") Id.
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commission and took the oath of President as a civilian.275 Before
resigning however, he transferred the power of lifting emergency
rule to the President, therefore ensuring that he still held the reins
of power.276 Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar, who had taken the oath
to uphold Musharraf s second emergency rule, was sworn in as
Chief Justice.27' On November 4, Chief Justice Dogar overruled
Chaudhry's annulment, validating the emergency declaration.278
The reconstituted Supreme Court then dismissed the challenge to
Musharraf s election on November 22, 2007.279
VII.Conclusion
Though he was re-elected in November 2007 to a five-year
presidential term and confirmed by a Supreme Court again filled
with his sworn supporters, General Musharraf's victory was short
lived. In the February 2008 parliamentary elections, Pakistani
citizens voted to remove almost all of Musharraf's party "in what
government and opposition politicians said was a firm rejection of
his policies since 2001. " 280 Political parties who had formerly
worked in opposition banded together in a coalition to get
Musharraf out of office. Facing impeachment, Musharraf resigned
from the presidency on August 18, 2008.21
This paper examined the Pakistani judiciary's reaction to
General Musharraf's rise to power, from the initial enthusiastic
acceptance of the army regime to later outright opposition by the
275 See. e.g.. Gall & Perlez, supra note 18.
276 Id.
277 Musharraf Imposes Emergency Rule, BBC NEWS, Nov. 3, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7076670.stm.
278 Rezaul H. Laskar, New Pak CJ Overrules Chaudhry's Order Annulling
Emergency, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/
StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=IndiaSectionPage&id=63940c72-c938-4251-
b659-e95a 19d1d4d4&&Headline=New+Pak+CJ+overrules+order+on+emergency.
279 Qaiser Felix, Supreme Court Upholds Musharraf's Election, ASIA NEWS, Nov.
22, 2007, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art-10872.
280 Carlotta Gall & Jane Perlez, Pakistanis Deal Severe Defeat to Musharraf in
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/asia/19pstan.html.
281 Jane Perlez, Pakistan Coalition Moves to Impeach Musharraf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/world/asia/08pstan.html; Jane
Perlez, In Musharrafs Wake, U.S. Faces Political Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/world/asia/19pstan.html.
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entire legal profession, led by the dynamic presence of Chief
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. The Judiciary's role was not only to
check executive and legislative power, but also to control the
military power that was concentrated in the President's person. In
Musharraf's presidency and his conflict with Chief Justice
Chaudhry's court, the Pakistani judiciary began to assert its power
as Executive will came to bear on the use of military power in
terrorism investigations and detentions.
Domestically, Chief Justice Chaudhry and the Supreme
Court's willingness to check executive power inspired nationwide
confidence in the Judiciary. Taking cases based on original
jurisdiction, the Chaudhry Court initiated rulings to curtail
Musharraf's attempts to consolidate power on every front--
economic, social, legal, and political. Musharraf claimed in his
Proclamation of Emergency that this activism eroded the
separation of powers and led the Judiciary to improperly interfere
with executive and legislative power.282 But perhaps any activism
was a small price to pay for preventing a fledgling democracy
from falling, again, into the hands of a military dictator.
The operation of an independent judiciary in Pakistan at this
critical moment in history was also important internationally
because of the potential concentration of executive and military
power in one Head of State and Pakistan's role in the global War
on Terror. Musharraf and his army regime secretly detained
nearly 500 citizens with no process, possibly torturing the men as
well.283 Chaudhry's initiative in demanding that the government
trace and provide process to these men "was very embarrassing to
the government because the [detainees who were released] told all
their stories." '284 By adding its rulings to international calls for fair
terrorism prosecutions and an end to torture, the Chaudhry
Supreme Court not only effectuated the release of those who were
detained without cause, but began the movement towards a just
and effective fight against terrorism.
Musharraf was not the first President to try to control the
decisions that went in and came out of the Pakistan judiciary, and
probably will not be the last. His actions to ensure judiciary
282 Proclamation of Emergency, 2007 (Pak.), supra note 234.
283 Gall, Picture of Secret Detentions Emerges in Pakistan, supra note 239.
284 Id.
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confirmation were similar to General Zia-ul-Haq's procedures
after he took power. Under Zia, judges "were required to take a
loyalty oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order, which
amounted to a pledge of allegiance to the new military order....
At the same time, the oath was used to purge independent-minded
judges, who refused the oath or were not invited to take it.285
After his 1999 coup and 2007 re-election, Musharraf followed the
same pattern, removing any judges who would question him and
then packing the court with oath-taking supporters.
However, the difference between the 2007 attempt and past
attempts, and the factor which may hinder future usurpations of
judicial power, was the willingness of thousands of Pakistani
lawyers nationwide to protest and boycott courts in the name of
judicial independence. This movement was inspired by Chief
Justice Chaudhry's defiance and confidence in standing up to
military excesses, despite acquiescence in his earlier Supreme
Court career. Former Law Minister Iftikhar Gilani explained the
legal community's reaction to Musharraf's summons of the Chief
Justice to the Army House in March, 2007: "That frame, of the
Chief Justice sitting in front of the general, did for Pakistan what
the Tiananmen Square photo of the boy standing before the tank
did for China .... Almost every Pakistani has seen that image,
and it has become a symbol of defiance against military rule." '286
The long-term and continuous political pressure from Pakistani
citizens themselves was a major factor of Musharraf's increasingly
frustrated desperation as his hopes of re-election were threatened.
Though Chaudhry was unable to prevent Musharraf from again
taking drastic action in 2007, the rulings that he made as Chief
Justice and the confidence that he inspired in the legal community
may have paved the way for resistance by independent-minded
judges in the future. The message sent by the judiciary was clear
to Musharraf and to any future military President: Though he
could attempt to subjugate the courts to his decrees and silence
those who would question him, no longer would the common man
stand behind such executive arrogance.
285 Siddique, supra note 17, at 627.
286 Baker, supra note 141.
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VIII. Author's Note
Since this article was completed, Iftikhar Chaudhry was
reinstated to his post as Chief Justice of Pakistan.287 After
continued pressure from the public and former Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister Gilani announced that Chief Justice
Abdul Hameed Dogar would retire on March 21, 2009, and
"Iftikhar Chaudhry and all other deposed judges [would] be
reinstated., 288  The Chaudhry court seems to be continuing in its
actions against executive power. Beyond picking up from where
he left off, Chaudhry is even leading the court to issue retroactive
rulings nullifying Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar's actions.
The Court has not yet gone so far as to charge Musharraf with
treason, as called for by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,28 9
but it demanded in July 2009 that Musharraf justify his November
2007 emergency actions.290  Legal experts said that although
Musharraf was not obligated to appear before the Court because
no formal criminal charges had been filed, it would be better for
Musharraf to appear voluntarily to maintain his right to appeal
later legal action. 291 Neither Musharraf nor his lawyers appeared
287 Gilani Announces Restoration of Deposed Chief Judge, DAWN, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-
library/dawnlnews/pakistan/gilani-announces-restoration-of-deposed-chief+judge-hs.
(Zardari's victory left former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as the main opposition
leader. Nawaz Sharif continued to demand that Chief Justice Chaudhry be reinstated.);
see Syed Shoaib Hasan, Profile: Yousuf Raza Gilani, BBC NEWS, June 17, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/7310028.stm. Yousuf Raza Gilani became Prime
Minister of Pakistan in March 2008, after the Pakistan People's Party won the most votes
in the February election; Bhutto's Widower Wins Presidency, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7600917.stm. Asif Ali Zardari, widower of
Benazir Bhutto, won the September 2008 presidential election.
288 Hasan, supra note 287. Gilani also revoked section 144, a law that outlawed
public demonstrations, and ordered provincial governments to "release political workers,
lawyers and all those arrested during the long march." Id. Gilani said, "I want to
congratulate the nation. Let us celebrate this with dignity .... This was the promise
made by our late leader Benazir Bhutto .... I think the time has come to fulfill this
promise." Id.
289 M. Ilyas Khan, Call for Musharraf Treason Trial, BBC NEWS, June. 3, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7434427.stm.
290 See Rana Tanveer, Musharraf Not Bound to Appear Before SC: Experts, DAILY
TIMES, July 23, 2009, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?
page=2009%5CO7%5C23%5Cstory_23-7-2009_pg7_ 16.
291 Id.
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in court on the appointed date.292  Instead, Musharraf gave a
televised interview in which he defended his emergency actions as
"absolutely constitutional and legal." "I don't blame myself," he
said, adding that the "[h]andling of the Chief Justice [by some
officials] was shabby. 293
The Supreme Court heard the constitutional petition despite
Musharrafs absence, first affirming that the Court attempted to
deliver the notice of summons to Musharraf's residence but that
the man who answered the door refused to take it.294 The Court
held that Musharrafs November 2007 declaration of emergency,
the PCO, and the replacement of Chaudhry and other federal
judges were unconstitutional and invalid.295 The opinion speaks
extensively about the need for an independent judiciary. "An
independent and strong judiciary is a back bone of viable
democratic system[s] all over the world. 2 96 The Court held that
any judge who took the 2007 Oath of Office violated the
constitution and also that the Supreme Court's emergency order on
November 3 that marked Musharraf's actions was illegal. 97 The
Court was explicit about the sweeping effect of this ruling: All
judges who took the oath were to be removed from their posts, all
appointments made in consultation with Dogar were nullified, and
all orders and judgments made by any court with any
292 Musharraf Court Notice Unheeded, BBC NEWS, July 29, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/8173942.stm.
293 Javaid Naqvi, CJ's Dismissal Was Right Thing to Do: Musharraf, DAWN, July
25, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcrn/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/
world/i 2-cj+dismissal+was+right+thing+to+do+musharraf--bi-08.
294 Sindh High Court Bar Association et. al. v. Federation of Pakistan,
Constitutional Petition 9 of 2009, at 5 (2009) (Pak.), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user-files/File/CONST.P.9OF2009.pdf; see also
Syed Shoaib Hasan, Musharraf Emergency "Unlawful", BBC NEWS, July 31, 2009,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/8178969.stm. Musharraf's lawyers
claimed that they had not received notice of the trial. Id.
295 See Sindh High Court Bar, supra note 294, at 12.
296 Id. at 8-10. The opinion states that Musharraf's actions were "undeniably taken
to prevent" the Court from hearing the petition against his presidential candidacy. But
the opinion is not without bitterness. "[T]his country witnessed that... [the] tenure of a
Chief Justice of Pakistan was curtailed with ulterior motives ... and pliant members of
[the] superior judiciary were out rightly given undeserved benefits while the others were
shown doors .... Many judges of superior judiciary who declined to toe [Musharraf's]
line of action were unceremoniously sacked." Id. at 8-9.
297 HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 28, at 5-6.
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unconstitutionally appointed judge were voided.298 The opinion
also states that Chaudhry is, and always was, the constitutional
Chief Justice of Pakistan. 99
For now, the Court has passed any discussion of a treason
charge to the National Assembly.300 In August 2009, a lower court
ordered the Islamabad police to file a case against Musharraf for
illegally confining judges and their families in their homes during
the November emergency.3 ' A sentence for the criminal charge
could mean a three-year imprisonment.
30 2
The Court is continuing to tread new and uneasy grounds in its
relationship with the executive branch. Any legal action against a
former military dictator is unprecedented in Pakistan; former Chief
Justice Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui noted that "in the past, courts have
tended to condone military takeovers."'3 3  It remains to be
determined whether the Pakistani judiciary, under Chaudhry's
leadership, has blurred the line between judicial independence and
judicial activism.30 4 What is clear is that Pakistanis were ecstatic
at the victory of the lawyer's movement that stood up for the rule
of law and brought back their "savior."3 5
TAIYYABA AHMED QURESHI
298 Sindh High Court Bar, supra note 294, at 16-20.
299 Id. at 17.
300 Pakistan Police in Musharraf Move, BBC NEWS, Aug. 11, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/8194970.stm.
301 Munawar Azeem, Court Orders Police to Register Case Against Musharraf
DAWN, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-
library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-pervez-musharraf-faces-new-probe-qs-08.
302 Pakistan Police in Musharraf Move, supra note 300.
303 Explain Emergency, Musharraf Told, BBC NEWS, July 22, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/8162697.stm.
304 See Anwar Syed, Judicial Activism, DAWN, July 26 2009,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/16-
judicial-activism-hs-07.
305 Salman Masood, Reinstated, Chief Justice Bears Hopes of Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES,
March 28, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/world/asia/
29chaudhry.html?_r-i &n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/C/Chaudhry,%201fti
khar%20Muhammad.
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